Differences across countries, industries, occupations and firms in the use of occasional telework before the crisis can be informative about the scope for more widespread use of telework during normal times, as well as about factors that need to be in place to use telework efficiently or that may prevent its use. By way of example, to the extent that factors such as lack of ICT skills, inefficient management practices or tasks requiring physical presence prevent the use of telework and are more common in some countries or types of firms than others, cross-country or cross-firm differences in the prevalence of telework give an indication of the scope for increasing telework via better management practices and public policies aimed at widening access to it.
Information on the use of telework before the crisis thereby complements insights gained from the use of telework during the crisis. The fast pace with which many firms adapted to the health crisis by conducting a large number of jobs from home indicates that the use of telework pre-crisis remained well below what is feasible. In the US for instance, 94 percent of 1 500 hiring managers surveyed in April 2020 indicated that some of their workers teleworked during the crisis (Ozimek, 2020[6]); in another survey that is representative for the US population, out of 25 000 respondents surveyed in April 2020, 34 percent of those employed four weeks earlier indicated having switched to telework during this period (Brynjolfsson et al., 2020[7]). However, the use of telework during the crisis may only be partly transferable to telework during “normal times”: during confinement telework usually requires all tasks associated with a job to be done from home, whereas occasional or even regular teleworking before the crisis requires only some tasks to be done remotely. Moreover, workers were usually forced to telework during the crisis. While many may continue to telework in the longer term, as long as regulatory and other obstacles to telework persist many others may not want to.
Already in 2015 a substantial fraction of workers across many OECD countries teleworked – i.e. worked outside the office, from home or a public space – at least occasionally during the previous year (Figure 1). Yet, the extent of people teleworking varied widely across countries, from around 25 percent in Portugal and Italy to more than twice as many people in Sweden and Denmark.
It is important to note that the share of people having teleworked shown in Figure 1 deviates from recent studies estimating the scope of jobs that can be performed by teleworking during the crisis (Dingel and Neiman, 2020[8]; Boeri, Caiumi and Paccagnella, 2020[9]); jobs that allow doing some tasks from home may not be suitable to be done entirely through teleworking. For instance, while in Sweden 57.2 percent of people reported having done some telework in 2015, only 30.7 percent of current jobs could be done during strict confinement (Boeri, Caiumi and Paccagnella, 2020[9]). Interestingly, however, cross-country differences in the scope of jobs to be done entirely from home – based on occupational tasks, which may more closely reflect constraints to telework due to the nature of the jobs – are generally smaller than differences in actual telework reported in Figure 1. This suggests that, besides the industrial structure of countries -- i.e. differences in the composition of types of jobs leading to workers performing a different mix of tasks in each country -- other factors such as culture, use of managerial practices, the digital infrastructure, the skill endowment or the age structure of the workforce may drive these differences.4
Figure 1. Use of telework varies widely across countries
Share of people using telework in 2015/2016
Note: Figure shows use of telework for a selection of OECD countries and EU-average. For all countries except USA it shows the percentage of people (employed or self-employed) who reported having worked from home or a public space (such as cafés, libraries) during the reference year. Military occupations and subsistence farmers have been excluded from the sample. *For USA figure shows the percentage of employees who worked remotely during 2016.
Source European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2017[10]); for the US Mann and Adkins (2017[11]).
In addition, occasional teleworking shown in Figure 1 appears to be much more widespread than regular teleworking. For instance, in Germany only 12 percent of workers teleworked from home at least 1 day per week in 2014, and in Hungary only 1 percent did so during the past 4 weeks, while in both countries almost 30 percent of workers teleworked occasionally in 2015 (Eurofound and International Labour Office, 2017[12]). Similarly for the US, while 43 percent of employees worked from home during 2016, only 15 percent of working hours between 2011 and 2018 were performed from home (Hensvik, Le Barbanchon and Rathelot, 2020[13]). The large discrepancy between regular and occasional telework again suggests that – besides technical requirements – substantial non-technical obstacles to telework exist: most workers who could perform at least some tasks from home may choose not to do so, e.g. because of not having access to a suitable working environment at home or out of fear of being ‘stigmatised’. This potentially large role played by ‘cultural’ and other factors provides an indication for how much policies could help to increase telework, especially in countries with low use of telework pre-crisis such as Portugal.
The extent of telework also varied widely across sectors. It was most common in knowledge-intensive services, e.g. professional and ICT services, and least common in manufacturing and less knowledge-intensive market services, e.g. including wholesale and retail and transportation (Figure 2 – for more detailed industries see Figure A1 in the Annex). These differences are likely to at least partly reflect task requirements, as many high skilled jobs in knowledge-intensive industries can be done remotely using laptops, whereas a physical presence is more likely to be required for many jobs in manufacturing or, say, accommodation. Similarly, many non-market services comprise jobs for which a physical presence is an important component, e.g. health and social work. Interestingly, a comparatively high fraction of people working in agriculture, construction, mining, electricity or water supply – denoted above as ‘other industries’ – used telework. While the current data do not allow a breakdown by industries and occupations, future work may shed light on which types of jobs teleworked intensively in these industries.
These broader patterns notwithstanding, there is substantial variation across industries within the aggregate sectors shown in Figure 2. For instance, education and activities of extraterritorial bodies in non-market services, including international organisations such as the OECD or the International Monetary Fund, are among the industries with the highest share of telework. Similarly, in less knowledge-intensive market services, real estate activities exhibit a large fraction of people doing telework. Although a substantial share of workers in public administration teleworked occasionally, this share still appears low in comparison to industries in knowledge-intensive market services that may perform many similar tasks. This comparatively low share may partly reflect a larger reluctance, or fewer incentives, to adopt novel working models. The crisis may act as a catalyst especially for the public sector to adopt these measures with potentially positive spill-over effects for productivity also in the market sector.
Figure 2. Use of telework varies across sectors
Cross-country average of percentage of people using telework in 2015 by sector
Note: The figure shows the percentage of people (employed and self-employed) who reported having worked at home or a public space (such as cafés, libraries) during the reference year by sector. Percentages are calculated as unweighted cross-country averages for each sector across Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and UK. Sectors are aggregated from NACE Rev. 2 1-digit industries. Military occupations and subsistence farmers are excluded from the sample. Other industries include: Agriculture, forestry and fishery; mining and quarrying; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning; water supply and waste management activities; construction. Figure A1 in the annex shows the use of telework for more detailed industries included in each sector. Note that the underlying sample at the household level has not been stratified by industry; observations have been reweighted to account for each country’s industrial structure. While the reported shares may not be statistically representative at the industry-level as a result, a comparison exercise with representative micro data from the UK has yielded a satisfactory accuracy.
*Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
*Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2017[10]).
As mentioned above, occupations vary in their potential to telework. Accordingly, Figure 3 confirms that the actual occupational use of telework before the crisis also varied substantially. Grouping occupations by skill content, teleworking was most common among high skilled occupations, e.g. managers and professionals, suggesting that many occupations prone to be done remotely for now require high skills. Indeed, cognitive and non-cognitive skills receive the highest returns in digital-intensive industries (Grundke et al., 2018[14]). However, continuing digitisation may further increase the range of tasks to be done remotely (Autor, 2014[15]). Telework was lowest among low- and medium-skilled workers, comprising occupations with many tasks requiring a physical presence, e.g. personal care workers, production workers or sales staff. Yet, among selected medium- and low-skilled occupations telework was in fact relatively frequent, notably market-oriented skilled agricultural workers or street vendors, which may reflect a high share of self-employed doing telework. Nonetheless, the overall high share of telework in high skilled relative to medium and low skilled occupations suggests that, in the absence of targeted measures to reduce gaps in the ability to telework, more widespread telework could exacerbate disparities in working conditions in the long-run.
Figure 3. Use of telework varies by occupational skill intensity
Cross-country average of percentage of people using telework in 2015 by occupational skill group
Note: The figure shows the percentage of people (employed and self-employed) who reported having worked at home or a public space (such as cafés, libraries) during the reference year by occupational skill group. The percentages are calculated as unweighted cross-country averages for each occupational skill group across Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and UK. Military occupations and subsistence farmers are excluded from the sample. Skill grouping of 2-digit ISCO 08 occupations are based on Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014[16]) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011[17]). Figure A2 in the annex provides shows the use of telework by 2-digit ISCO 08 occupations included in each skill group. Note that the underlying sample at the household level has not been stratified by occupations; observations have been reweighted to account for each country’s occupational structure. The reported shares may not be statistically representative at the occupational-level as a result.
*Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
*Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2017[10]).
The general pattern of actual telework across occupations roughly fits the rankings by scope of occupations to telework during the crisis, such as those reported by Dingel and Neiman (2020[8]) – consistent with evidence that some occupations are intensive in tasks that are particularly prone to telework. However, it is important to note that the suitability of an occupation to be performed through telework during the crisis is more stringent than the requirement to perform some of the tasks through telework; as occupations comprise a range of different tasks, some of which can be done remotely and some which may require or benefit from physical presence, many occupations that cannot entirely be done through telework are nevertheless fit for regular or occasional telework, e.g. sales staff or teachers may spend some days with face-to-face contact with customers and students while doing admin tasks at home, lab researchers who need to conduct experiments can write papers from home.
In addition to differences in telework across countries, sectors and occupations, also differences across firms may indicate which factors are conducive to telework in ways that can affect productivity.5 Some evidence on the characteristics of firms using telework can be gained from the use of trust-based working time arrangements (TBW) in Germany. TBW can be seen as a prerequisite for telework. Similar to telework, TBW implies giving up control over working time and assessing worker performance solely based on their outputs (Viete and Erdsiek, 2018[18]). Firms using TBW may therefore be more likely to use telework. In fact, for 2018 – when information on telework and TBW are available for Germany – there is a positive and significant correlation between using TBW and teleworking from home (correlation coefficient 0.3).
Figure 4 shows that the use of TBW is more widespread among the most productive firms, which are almost twice as likely to use TBW as the least productive firms. Importantly, however, these results do not indicate that firms are more productive because they use TBW; productive firms may share characteristics, such as using advanced management practices, which raise productivity and make it more likely to use TBW. Results do show however that the use of TBW is compatible with high performance.
Figure 4. Use of trust-based working time arrangements (TBW) increases with productivity
TBW use in Germany across the productivity distribution
Note:The figure shows the difference in the share of firms using trust-based working time arrangements (TBW) between each productivity group and the bottom decile of the productivity distribution as percentage of the share in the bottom decile. Productivity groups refer to low-medium (2-4th decile), medium (5-6th decile), high-medium (7-9th decile), and frontier (10th decile). Deciles are based on annual productivity distribution within STAN A38 industries, excluding agriculture, forestry and fishery, financial and insurance activities, and public sector. Productivity is measured as 3-year backward moving average based on gross-output per worker. Results show unweighted average of shares across years and industries.
Source: OECD calculations based on German LIAB for 2000-2016.
TBW is also more common among larger firms. Figure 5 shows how much more likely medium and large firms are to use TBW compared to small firms with otherwise similar characteristics, i.e. productivity, workforce composition, industry and firm age. For instance, large firms are almost 20 percentage points more likely than small firms to use TBW. This large effect may reflect a number of features associated with firm size and not included in the model, e.g. the use of advanced management practices, which warrant further analysis.
In addition to productivity and size, the firm’s workforce composition is also linked with the use of TBW. Figure 6 shows that firms with younger and more skilled workers and managers are more likely to use TBW. For instance, replacing 10 percent of workers who have medium skills with high-skilled workers increases the probability to use TBW by about 2 percentage points; similarly, replacing 10 percent of managers who are middle-aged with older ones decreases the probability by 0.7 percentage points. The link between skills and TBW is in line with the fact that telework is more common among higher skilled professions (e.g. Eurofound and International Labour Office (2017[12])). This may reflect that higher skilled workers on average may be better able to work independently, or that they may better engage in creative tasks in a flexible working environment. Similarly, highly skilled managers may be more prone to allow TBW as they are better able to implement it successfully, e.g. through establishing trust-based relationships with workers. The fact that TBW is less common among firms with a higher share of older workers may reflect their reluctance to deviate from traditional working models, or that older workers are less likely to possess the ICT skills necessary for telework. It may, however, also reflect differences in preferences, as competing tasks – and demands for better work-life balance – may be particularly pressing among young and middle-aged workers, e.g. when both parents are working with small children at home.
Figure 5. Use of trust-based working time arrangements (TBW) in Germany increases with firm-size
Marginal effect on TBW use of increasing firm size from small to medium and large
Note: The figure shows the expected marginal changes of probability of using trust-based working time arrangements when firm-size increases relative to small firms. Firm size groups comprise small (10-49 employees), medium (50-249) and large (250 or more). Results are based on a linear probability model of TBW use at the firm-level, controlling for log productivity, skill, age and gender composition of managers and workers respectively, share of part-time male and female employees, manager share, manager remuneration, firm-size and -age, and industry-year fixed effects. All variables except TBW use and firm-age are based on 3-year backward moving averages. Productivity is measured as gross-output per worker. Industries correspond to STAN A38, excluding agriculture, forestry and fishery, financial and insurance activities, and public sector. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Results are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Source: OECD calculations based on German LIAB for 2000-2016.
Figure 6. Use of trust-based working time arrangements (TBW) in Germany increases with a younger and more highly skilled workforce
Note: The figure shows the expected marginal changes in the probability of using trust-based working time arrangement for changes in the workforce composition. Results are based on a linear probability model of TBW use at the firm-level, controlling for log productivity, skill, age and gender composition of managers and workers respectively, share of part-time male and female employees, manager share, manager remuneration, firm-size and -age, and industry-year fixed effects. All variables except TBW use and firm-age are based on 3-year backward moving averages. Productivity is measured as gross-output per worker. Employees are classified as managers based on occupations. Industries correspond to STAN A38, excluding agriculture, forestry and fishery, financial and insurance activities, and public sector. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Marginal effects are shown for a 10-percentage point increase in the share of older/high skilled managers/workers respectively with a corresponding decline in middle aged/medium skilled managers/workers. High skilled/medium skilled employees correspond to employees with university or technical college/occupational degree. Older/middle aged employees correspond to employees aged 50-85/30-50. Results are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Source: OECD calculations based on German LIAB for 2000-2016.
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1.
Consistent with this, occupations that are less prone to teleworking showed a much stronger increase in unemployment claims during the initial lockdown phase of the crisis (Kahn, Lange and Wiczer, 2020[52]). However, they also saw a slightly larger drop in job vacancies, which possibly indicates that the demand fall for such activities is likely to be more significant.
3.
For further implications of the COVID-19 crisis on productivity, including disruptions to value chains and potential reshoring, structural changes and reallocations across sectors, firms and in the composition and human capital of the workforce, see Di Mauro and Syverson (2020[53]). For the productivity impacts through financial factors, see OECD (2020[54]).
4.
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007[55]) provide evidence on substantial differences in management practices across countries; (Bloom, Kretschmer and Reenen, 2009[23]) provide evidence on cross-country differences in work-life balances. For evidence on the ability to telework during the crisis, Brussevic, Dabla-Norris and Khalid (2020[2]) examine the role of socio-economic differences across countries.
5.
Important differences in telework can also arise due to a range of other factors, e.g. differences in worker characteristics or regional factors. For the role of skills for the ability to telework see Espinoza and Reznikova (2020[57]); for the ability to telework during the crisis by regions, see OECD (2020[56]).
6.
Whether we think of the amount of telework as the fraction of workers or the share of work-time for an individual worker, the main patterns and trade-offs are very similar.
7.
For instance, sectors and occupations performing more complex tasks may rely more on communication, thus experiencing lower efficiency gains from telework, which implies a lower optimal level of telework.