What is the primary role of the incident commander?

Incident Commander

The incident commander has overall responsibility at the incident or event. A distinctive vest that contains the words “Incident Commander” is worn as identification. The incident commander determines objectives and establishes priorities based on the nature of the incident, available resources, and agency (or company) policy.4 The role of the incident commander is usually filled by the first responder to arrive at the scene, who is relieved of this duty when a more senior responder or a designated incident commander arrives. A command post is set up at a safe distance near the location of the emergency where the incident commander will manage the response. Once established, the command post should not be moved unless the conditions of the emergency pose a threat. It can be located in the field, at a vehicle, inside an office, or where reliable communications (electronic and verbal) and security (access control) can be maintained. When appropriate, it should be within view of the incident but away from noise or activity that may interfere with the command efforts.

Management must delegate (ahead of time) to the incident commander the authority to make the tactical decisions necessary to stabilize or end the emergency without interference by those who would normally possess some degree of authority. Management’s role is in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to make strategic decisions based on the events or to allocate resources among multiple incidents, generally not at the scene of an incident. Reliable communications between the EOC and incident commander are essential. The incident commander follows preexisting policy set by management and will use standard forms and checklists to ensure that all tasks are completed. Software programs are available to aid in the management of the emergency in the field, but for these tools to work effectively, as we will point our later, they must be practiced and reside on systems that can withstand field conditions and the possibility of limited resources such as electrical power or extra batteries.

Some of the specific duties of the incident commander are as follows:

Overall field management and responsibility of the emergency

Coordination with the EOC or other incident commanders. The incident commander of the firm’s ERT should co-locate with the fire or police department incident commander (an element of Unified Command).

Ultimate responsibility for the safety of responders

Approval of all Incident Action Plans and resources

Situational analysis

Setting objectives and priorities

Delegating authority as necessary

Primary responder until others arrive

If the size of the emergency warrants the establishment of the following positions, assistants to the incident commander include an information officer, safety officer, and liaison officer.

The mass-casualty incident management equipment

The need to consider all the aspects of the MCI environment and human operator characteristics during an MCI makes the mission of designing MCI management equipment complex and challenging. The equipment should support the MCI treatment procedure, leading the commander through the three main phases described above. We will examine the equipment the MCI commander is using and demonstrate how it is designed under the constraints of the two other pillars.

The first tool the MCI commander would use is the paramedic field guide. This is a small booklet listing the main protocols paramedics need to follow, and it is used to refresh their memory on specific emergency protocols. Since the guide is small and contains information for varied situations, most paramedics always carry it in one of their pockets, so it will always be handy. Although this might seem like a very low-tech solution for information retrieval, the fact that it can be accessed at any time and under any condition (as long as there is a light source) makes it very suitable for the MCI environment.

In addition to the small field guide the MCI commander would have an MCI kit to support his/her role and provide the paramedics who arrive at the scene with tools designed specifically for MCIs. In order to act as a commander, the paramedic who takes on this role needs to be easily identified and heard. A highly visible vest labeling role (Medical Services Commander) will inform everyone who is in charge. A battery-powered megaphone will assist the commander in communicating commands to other paramedics and rescue teams. To help overcome memory limitations during the high workload, the MCI kit also includes incident command priority protocols with detailed lists of instructions that should be followed during the MCI, along with worksheets and a clipboard.

While paramedics always have to assess their patients’ condition, the fact that in an MCI they need to care for more than one patient raises a special need—how to document information about a patient so the next paramedic, who will continue caring for this patient, will have all the information that was already collected about this patient. The MCI kit has two simple tools to assist in delivering these important details. The first is a set of permanent markers, and the second, triage tags in four colors: red (emergency) to mark casualties that need immediate treatment, yellow (urgent) for significant injuries that can tolerate a delay in care, green (nonurgent) for people who can safely wait for treatment, and black for expired casualties. These tags are used to quickly mark casualties’ priority after the first assessment. Again, simplicity is an important characteristic in the MCI environment because no special setup is required, and these tools can operate under any conditions. This simplicity also assists the human operator (the paramedic) by serving as a memory aid using a tool that helps in following the MCI protocol (Fig. 8.1):

The equipment the MCI commander is using follow the few basic design principals we discussed earlier in this chapter:

They are designed to operate in varied MCI environments, as they are not dependent on resources nor on specific conditions in the environment.

As these artifacts are not electronic but based on paper and cardboard they are resilient to failure and will function effectively under extreme and unexpected conditions.

Taking into consideration the human condition during the MCI, they are very easy to operate and serve the operators as a reminder, leading them through the procedures that need to be done.

4 Conclusion

In this research, the authors developed the cyber exercise in the form of a computer game for educating incident commanders in CI owner companies. Through workshops with OT and cyber security experts, the developed prototype was successfully evaluated by using the participants' questionnaire. To apply this prototype to each company, it is necessary to customize the data to reflect the situation (such as the organization structure, the jurisdiction scope, the corporate culture and so on) of each company.

At present, however, the complexity of the data integrity makes it difficult to prepare unified template to simplify the customization. Accordingly, we will continue to develop the utility tools to promote our exercise.

On the Ground

Although the overall approach to disaster response can quickly start to sound like alphabet soup, it is not that complicated. An Incident Command System (ICS) is simply a standardized management system that is built on modular units, the complexity of which can be scaled up or down depending on the extent of the problem. It establishes a common structure and vocabulary for all the agencies, at all levels, of government that are involved in a response. It can be used in a situation as simple as that involving several agencies from one jurisdiction—for example, local police and fire departments. Or it can be scaled up to accommodate multiple agencies from multiple jurisdictions, as in a large-scale emergency. NIMS is essentially one kind of an ICS.

Central to the ICS/NIMS approach is the concept of unified command. Unified command, another standardized management approach, means that rather than have a silo-like approach in which each agency or jurisdiction operates independently, a collaborative structure is set up. If police, fire, and social services departments were all responding to a plane crash, for example, representatives from each of those agencies would be working literally together, in the same location (an incident command post), and jointly making decisions, rather than proceeding with each agency issuing directions for the workers within its control without consultation with the other agencies. The lead person on site in charge of an agency’s operations would be the agency’s incident commander. Together, the incident commanders would make decisions. If no other level of government was involved, then the mayor, for example, might appoint one overall incident commander.

In response to a large-scale disaster, the modular approach would scale up to accommodate the greater complexity and larger number of persons and entities involved. For example, all local agency leaders would report to the local incident commander; all state agency leaders would report to the state incident commander, and so forth. The incident commanders representing federal, state, and local operations would collaborate in the unified command. However, each agency would retain its full scope of legal authority and responsibility.

The Best of Both

Effective response requires strong vertical lines in our organizations. Hierarchy provides the critical, unifying structure to the capacity of complex organizations. But effective response also requires strong horizontal relationships to put that capacity to work. We need to organize vertically and to work horizontally.

Donald F. Kettl, University of Pennsylvania

Background of Emergency Planning

The best emergency plan in the world will fail without leadership. Setting up the right structure to keep the response on track during a disaster or emergency is the first step to success. Fortunately, a great model has already been well tested and proved effective. The Incident Command System (ICS) is the structure developed that allows for flexibility while defining clear roles and functions to help navigate through a tough situation.

The ICS was first developed by the military and later adapted by crews fighting wildfires. As you can imagine, there were difficulties in coordinating response, allocating resources, and even planning what should be done. Crews were spread out across wilderness areas, each facing different challenges or needs. Multiple agencies were also involved, from local firefighters to sheriff’s departments as well as groups of firefighters brought in from out of state or other areas. Information from aerial surveillance had to be analyzed, strategies developed, and then the right resources with specific goals sent to the various areas around the fire to help contain it and protect homes or forests.

The basic structure consists of an incident commander who is ultimately responsible for all decisions. The incident commander is directly supported by a team, including a safety officer, security officer, public information officer, and liaison officer. There are several sections, each one in turn supported by a section chief who reports to the incident commander. The sections include operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration.

The incident commander has the overall responsibility to determine what goals need to be accomplished and the steps to reach those goals. The liaison officer coordinates with any external agencies or groups that may be involved or have asked for help, such as the local office of emergency management or local police. The safety and security officers may be combined into one role and are, as the name implies, responsible for the overall safety and security of those involved with the emergency response. The safety/security role is to identify any threatening situations that could jeopardize responders and make recommendations to adjust for risks. The public information officer, or PIO, is responsible for any media statements or communications, as well as internal communications to employees or affected groups.

Once the incident commander has outlined the overall objectives, the other sections each take on specific roles to achieve those objectives. The planning team is focused on information: what is happening around the organization or externally, as well as gathering information on what resources are available. The planning team takes that information to develop a timeline outlining what needs to be done in the immediate future as well as down the road, even into the recovery phase.

The logistics group is responsible for finding out what resources are on hand, where the resources are, or how to get them. A large piece of this often involves getting a labor team set up. Depending on the type of emergency and the response needed, a labor team can help by providing runners to get information to the right people in the midst of chaotic communications. The labor team may need to help move internal equipment, evacuate customers or patients, direct traffic, or secure the facility.

The operations team is responsible for the “doing.” This team has to carry out the planned tasks and may be dependent on the supplies procured by the logistics team. This is where the rubber meets the road. If the emergency involves damage to a critical building, the operations team will be responsible for assessing and repairing the damage. Specific team members may include a cross section from across the organization, such as information technology personnel, especially if the disaster affects data servers or equipment. In a hospital, operations may be focused around clinical care, especially if the emergency is an influx of patients or involves the evacuation of patients to other care sites. The labor team put together by the logistics crew may be put to work in a needed role.

Next is the finance or administration section. This group is responsible for tracking expenses, purchases, payroll issues, time sheets, or any other item that reflects a cost to the organization. For example, during a blizzard, hospital staff may be forced to stay overnight to continue caring for patients. Nearby hotel rooms may be used to give everyone a chance to get some sleep and rest between shifts. The finance team tracks those expenses as well as who was working at what times. The administrative side also includes keeping a log of decisions made at the incident command level as well as collecting and keeping any related paperwork.

The Incident Command System is designed to be flexible. That means for some situations you may not need to assign a person to each and every role. For example, if the scope of an emergency is smaller or temporary, the same person may fill the role of the operations section chief as well as the logistics chief.

In law enforcement, the first police officer on a scene becomes the incident commander. His responsibilities include making sure the scene is safe, identifying what additional resources will be needed and what immediate goals need to be established, and beginning to work towards those goals. As other police officers arrive, he will assign them as needed, similar to how the operations chief would work. In short, the initial response and preliminary ICS may be one person and grow to include other officers, supervisors, and even other agencies, such as the fire department or paramedics.

Fire departments routinely use the ICS in an even more formal way. The initial fire truck on scene quickly becomes the command center and even uses that term as the radio identifier. Eventually, when a battalion chief arrives, that person becomes the incident commander and takes on that radio designation to provide continuity of communication for everyone in the field reporting back or requesting instructions from the incident commander.

The United States’ Federal Emergency Management Agency has numerous free courses available online that help train individuals on ICS. These courses are a great way to get those in your organization familiar with the type of command structure that should be used to deal with emergency situations.

Plan Procedural Specifics

The second section of the EOP addresses definitions and assignment of roles and responsibilities. This section accounts for the real substance of the plan. While the first section dealt with creating a plan and organizing how it will be put into effect, this section is far more detailed and focuses on specifics within the emergency operations plan. This section begins with a school emergency management organization that follows the Incident Command System (ICS).

ICS is part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Developed in the aftermath of 9/11, NIMS is a consistent framework used by all agencies to respond to disasters. ICS is a NIMS tool developed for the command, control, and coordination of emergency response. In other words, “ICS helps you remember what tasks are important and when it is important to assign someone to do them.”2 Some administrators assume that first responders will meet this need, but responders often cannot arrive immediately, which means an in-house group must initially manage the incident. For many schools, the principal is the natural choice to fill the role of incident commander, but ICS requires redundancy. Who will serve as the incident commander's backup? Who will serve as that person's backup? In addition to the incident commander, schools must document positions such as public information officer, safety officer, liaison officer, operations, logistics, planning, and finance and administration. The goal is to have two alternates at every response position.

Collaboratively complete the ICS form utilizing personnel that are available during the school's normal operations, such as 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. This exercise can be challenging, but will pay dividends. The more difficult task surfaces in attempting to complete the ICS structure during the often-forgotten, after-hours timeframe. Many administrators question the feasibility of finding qualified individuals during this timeframe, but the need for a game plan to manage an after-hours emergency cannot be denied. To assist in addressing this need, we recommend asking staff members to complete a staff skills survey (Fig. 7.1) that identifies qualifications, certifications, training, and skills individuals possess. Once results are compiled, administrators often find that there are staff members working after-hours who have the skills to fill ICS positions. COVID-19 face mask requirements and the corresponding need for greater accountability during extracurricular activities may have forever eliminated the ineffective practice of assigning just one “administrator on duty.”

To assist in preparing emergency plans, the federal government has developed a course (ICS-100: Introduction to the Incident Command System) to familiarize school administrators with how ICS principles can be applied in school-based incidents and prepare schools to work together with community response personnel. In about an hour or two, school administrators can take this course and obtain professional development CEUs and certification at the FEMA website (https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-100.c).

Next, move from the high-level ICS components to more detailed roles and responsibilities. The actual first responder is usually the individual who discovers the emergency situation. For example, a teacher who encounters a fight between students might respond according to the following procedures.

Notify the school's incident commander immediately and get assistance.

Do not let a crowd incite participants.

Disperse onlookers and keep others from congregating in the area.

Use calm verbal commands to try to break up the fight first.

Avoid stepping between participants.

Once assistance arrives, work as a team to separate participants.

When participants are separated, move them quickly; escort the participants to the office and do not allow further visual or verbal contact.

Document all activities witnessed by staff.

Similarly, your EOP should detail the responsibilities of the incident commander and other members of the emergency team. Continue in this fashion to document the responsibilities of monitors who will ensure the proper execution of the planned response; the responsibilities for communicating with first responders, building occupants, families, representatives of the media, and other members of the community; and the responsibilities for maintaining emergency-related records.

Each response description should include the titles of the people who will lead and assist in the response. Be sure to include the name and contact information of the media coordinator (public information officer) who will take questions from reporters.

Other common features of each kind of emergency could involve evacuation from the building to a predetermined assembly site where faculty will ascertain who may still be in the building. Later may come relocation to another site where parents and students can reunite. Finally, the team leader will brief first responders and shift into a supporting role.

Vulnerability Analysis

Hazard identification, risk assessment, and impact analysis are important steps in the planning process, since many of the key decisions made relative to the emergency plan are based on this information. Many times this procedure can be accomplished by using a simple numerical rating system (scale of 1 to 5, with 1 as the lowest and 5 as highest) to list potential emergencies (such as fire, flood, terrorist attack, etc.), estimate the probability of each emergency occurring, assess the potential human impact (death and injury), property impact (losses and damages), potential business impact (loss of market share), and, finally, the strength of the internal and external resources that may be available (1 being weak resources and 5 indicating strong resources). Next, you would total the score for each potential emergency, taking into consideration that the lower the score, the better. Although somewhat subjective, the comparison will be of significant assistance in determining planning priorities. The following example helps to illustrate the process (Table 28-1) (FEMA, 2007):

Table 28-1. Vulnerability Analysis Chart

Note: The lower the score, the better.

Source: Adapted from FEMA’s Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry (2007).

The Incident Command System

Molino (2006) identified five common concepts relative to the control and management of emergencies. According to Molino, these concepts (referred to as the Five Cs of Command) form the basis of the Incident Command System (ICS):

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Command

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Control

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Communications

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Coordination

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Cooperation

ICS was developed in the early 1970s after a series of major wildfires in southern California. The fires affected all levels of government (federal, state, and local), and highlighted various recurring problems that prevented responding agencies from working together. In particular, determining who was in charge of the overall response effort, duplication of efforts, poor coordination due to no joint planning, lack of a common organization, and ineffective intra-agency communications, hindered the overall emergency response to the fires. ICS established an on-scene management system that would help responding agencies work together using a coordinated and systematic approach that can be used for all types of incidents regardless of size (Bullock et al., 2008; Canton, 2007; McEntire, 2007):

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Common Terminology: Common vocabulary is used instead of signal codes. Functional assignments are standardized and easily understood.

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Integrated Communications: To accommodate various agencies, a common communications plan is used with assigned frequencies.

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Unified Command Structure: The command structure expands when there is more than one responding agency, and all organizations share a common set of incident objectives and strategies.

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Unit Integrity: Typically, responding units are not broken up before being deployed. Most responders receive orders through their existing chain of command.

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Unity of Command: To avoid organizational confusion, every individual has a designated supervisor.

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Effective Span of Control: One supervisor for every 3–7 subordinates, with 5 being the optimum number.

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Modular Structure: Can expand or shrink based on needs.

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Comprehensive Resource Management: Human, material, and equipment resources are always checked in, and their status maintained at all times.

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Consolidated Action Plans: A single planning process, leading to one incident action plan.

The ICS structure is built around five major management activities or functions (McEntire, 2007) (Figure 28-4):

Figure 28-4. Basic incident command system organizational chart.

(Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008)

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Command: The incident commander (IC) determines strategy and objectives and is responsible for overall command of the incident. Three positions/functions work closely with the IC:

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Information Officer: Works with the media and releases information to the public as appropriate.

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Safety Officer: Monitors operations and advises the IC on all matters related to safety.

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Liaison Officer: Is the IC’s point of contact with representatives of other organizations.

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Operations: Responsible for directing and coordinating all tactical operations to meet incident objectives.

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Planning: Responsible for all incident-related data (gathering and analyzing) as well as the status of all available resources.

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Logistics: Responsible for providing the necessary support (facilities, services, and materials) to meet all needs for the incident or situation.

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Finance: Responsible for on-site financial and administrative management, including monitoring and documenting all costs related to the incident. This is especially important for reimbursement by the federal government when there is a Presidential Disaster Declaration.

It is important for protection officers to understand how ICS works for several reasons. First, it is a relatively simple on-scene management tool that has proven effective in a variety of settings over the years, including the private sector. Second, any time there is a serious incident that requires public safety personnel from any level of government to respond, they will likely be using ICS. Consequently, understanding ICS, and being able to seamlessly fit into this management system in an effort to solving problems, would be advantageous for all of the entities involved in the incident.

Bomb Threat

As part of the EOP/ERP annexes, all healthcare facilities should have policy and procedures for handling a bomb threat. Prevention is the first step to be taken against a bomb situation. These steps are the same security safeguards that should be in everyday use to protect the organization against other security risks. In other words, the proper functioning of the day-to-day protection system is the first line of defense against the bomb threat. To be more specific, locking equipment rooms, switchboard rooms, utility closets, and storage areas reduces risk. Limited access, access controls, noting suspicious people and vehicles, and providing emergency equipment are all part of the everyday protection system. One of the most important aspects of properly managing a bomb threat is to specifically establish organizational authority. Authority and responsibility for handling the initial crisis must be designated to a position readily available 24 hours a day. This position should be the Incident Commander. Logical choices for this role might be the nursing supervisor, the house officer, or the security shift supervisor.

A bomb threat can be received in numerous ways. The most common method is by telephone, and the most common recipient of such information is the switchboard (PBX) operator. Telephone operators, and others who are likely to receive these calls, should be trained to keep the caller talking as long as possible and to ask key questions, such as where the bomb is located, when it will go off, why it was placed, what kind of bomb it is, and other questions that may keep the caller on the line. The person who receives the call should make notes or activate a recording device. Not all threats indicate a bomb has been placed somewhere in the facility. The threat may indicate a bomb “will be” placed in the facility. When this type of threat is received, access controls must be expanded, and the organization may decide to examine property being brought into the facility.

Bomb threat information received must be communicated to the designated authority within the organization, which in turn activates the EOP/ERP. The first step in the notification procedure must always be to notify the appropriate law enforcement authority. In most cases, the law enforcement authority and facility management will decide jointly the type and extent of search required. It is not practical, or possible, to conduct an all-out search in every case. An all-out search includes everything from checking every patient’s belongings, to removing all suspended ceiling tiles and all ventilation grille work. It is presumed people who carry bombs are well aware of the danger of premature detonation, and therefore in most cases they will want to get into the facility quickly and to get out even more quickly—which generally precludes an elaborate hiding process. If sufficient organizational personnel are available, the search should be conducted by staff rather than by the police or fire department. The proper role of the outside support agencies is to assume control if a bomb or suspected bomb is located. Employees should conduct the search for two basic reasons. First, staff are in the best position to know what belongs and what does not belong in a given area. Staff are more knowledgeable of the layout of the facility, and either have the capability to enter locked or controlled areas or know how to obtain access.

The use of in-house personnel to search avoids unnecessary confusion and minimizes disruption. Experts believe bomb threat callers are frequently interested in stirring up as much activity and causing as much disruption as possible. Thus, one objective of a bomb search is to carry out the search in a smooth, routine manner, while taking every threat seriously. In bomb threat situations, the administrative person handling the threat may decide to advise only selected staff and patients. In general, patients should not be told of the problem unless absolutely necessary. Experience has shown patients often set off a chain reaction detrimental to the entire process. Patients may respond by calling their families. In turn, the family may decide to come to the facility or call the facility for detailed information. This reaction can tie up needed communications lines and hinder response capabilities.

Whether a search is full or partial, areas of responsibility must be assigned. Search personnel are assembled as a group so the search coordinator can relate to them the information received and assign specific areas to specific personnel. This information may also be communicated by telephone or through a public address system with a code term such as “Mr. Search” or “Code Green,” or via electronic means. A complexity that must be taken into consideration is the staffing pattern of the facility. When all departments are fully operational, the facility can be more easily and quickly searched than when departments are closed and locked. During the nonoperational period, security, maintenance, and environmental services personnel may be assigned an expanded role in the search effort. Floor plans, divided into specific search areas, are used in some facilities. Personnel are given a map of the area for which they are responsible. In other organizations, these assignments are made from an administrative checklist that defines the areas. However the parameters of the search are defined, the person responsible for searching a given area must always report back to the command center when the search has been completed. The primary concern is for personal safety rather than property.

If the search produces a bomb or a suspected bomb, the cooperative efforts of security and public safety agencies come into play. Facility employees should never touch a suspected bomb. The investigation and removal of any suspect object is the responsibility of the public safety agency. Security’s basic function is to seal off the area and to commence evacuation if necessary. The decision to evacuate rests with the hospital incident commander, working in cooperation with the public safety agency involved. A safe distance for evacuation is generally considered to be a 200-foot radius from the suspected object, including the floors immediately above and below.

The City Asserts Control and the Recovery Operation Commences

The City response began mere moments after the terrorist attacks on New York City. American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into One World Trade Center at 8:40 a.m. By 8:50 a.m. on September 11, the City, initially through the Fire Department, had established its Incident Command Post and had asserted control over the World Trade Center complex and the surrounding areas. The rescue and recovery efforts at the site were thereafter coordinated through the City Office of Emergency Management (“OEM”), with the Fire Department designated as the incident commander for the site, and with the City Department of Design and Construction (“DDC”) assuming total control over all aspects of safety, construction, demolition, and cleanup activities at the site.

On September 12, 2001, the DDC set up a temporary command center at Public School IS 89 in lower Manhattan, immediately to the north of the World Trade Center site, and commenced daily meetings to organize rescue and recovery efforts. Of utmost concern to the DDC was securing the World Trade Center site and limiting access to the area. Together with other City agencies, including the OEM, the DDC established stringent protocols determining “not only who would have access to the site, but also how that access would take place and under what constraints.” The City further enlisted the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the “Port Authority”) to assist in maintaining the security of the perimeter and to report observed safety protocol discrepancies.

The City also engaged private contractors for the recovery effort. On September 15, 2001, FEMA confirmed that contracts could be awarded without need for competitive bidding under the emergency conditions existing after September 11. Requirements for competitive bidding having been waived, and pursuant to the Declarations of Emergency issued at the City, State and Federal levels, the DDC engaged [several construction companies] to provide the work necessary for removal and demolition services. … The efforts of [these] contractors were coordinated, and supervised, through the DDC at twice daily meetings held at the temporary command center, and by numerous visits to the worksite. By September 14, 2001, the DDC had divided the site into four quadrants with a primary contractor assigned as a “construction manager” for each individual quadrant. The primary contractors acted as supervisors for their individual quadrants, with responsibility for enforcing applicable regulations and ensuring compliance. …

In the initial days and weeks following September 11, the City and its contractors, together with public utilities, worked also to restore essential services to the City. The September 11 attacks resulted in the immediate loss of power to all of lower Manhattan and in the destruction of critical components of the gas and steam infrastructure. The Con Edison substations, which had been located directly beneath World Trade Center Seven, were destroyed by fire and by the building's ultimate collapse, resulting in a critical disruption of services to Lower Manhattan. Con Edison assumed sole responsibility for restoring electric, gas and steam services and related facilities that were damaged or destroyed due to the events of September 11. The Verizon Building, located at 140 West Street, also sustained severe structural damage, crippling the phone system. Other critical services, such as the transportation system running through the World Trade Center site, were also destroyed and disrupted.

1.1 Application Overview

Although localization is becoming available for the general public and for businesses via widespread use of GPS receivers and commercial indoor location systems (e.g., Ubisense, Sonitor, and Ekahau), many solutions are not suitable for use by emergency responders such as firefighters. The conditions they work in are significantly more demanding than nonemergency environments. Darkness, smoke, fire, power cuts, water, and noise can all prevent a location system from working, and heavy protective clothing, gloves, and facemasks make using a standard mobile computer impossible. In the past decade, much research effort has been put into this challenging problem and a wide variety of ideas have been developed.