What is an example of consent of the governed

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed . . ."

Declaration of Independence, United States of America, 1776

The most fundamental concept of democracy is the idea that government exists to secure the rights of the people and must be based on the consent of the governed. Today, the quote above from the U.S. Declaration of Independence is considered a maxim of the ideal form of government. 

The essential meaning of “consent of the governed” can perhaps best be understood by examining countries where it is lacking. China is one example. In the spring of 1989, university students organized a prolonged series of protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to demand truth, accountability, freedom, and democracy from their government. They adopted as their symbol a likeness of the Statue of Liberty, calling it the Goddess of Liberty. Millions of people joined the students in Beijing and other cities across China to demand a voice in the government that had long been used to deny people's freedom.

Since the Communist Party had seized power in 1949, those who dared to oppose its dictates had been subject to arrest or worse. The regime's principal authority to govern was the Communist principle of "democratic centralism," meaning that the decisions of the party’s central leadership — and ultimately the party leader — could not be questioned. The Communist Party's repressive policies and ideological campaigns caused millions of deaths through famine, execution, and violent political purges.

The Chinese people consented to none of this. The communist regime had been built through revolution and terror; no free election had ever been held in the People's Republic. And in 1989 the Chinese people demanded democratic change. On June 4, Deng Xiaoping, the top Communist leader, ordered the use of force to put down the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and throughout China. The world saw students stand before tanks to resist, but ultimately they were helpless to prevent the mass killings and arrests that ensued. Nearly 30 years later, the Communist Party remains the supreme authority. The students and workers who sought democracy were imprisoned, expelled from school or fired from work, forced into exile, pressured to recant their views, and even denied housing. Until now, repression of human rights has effectively prevented any re-emergence of the popular demand for democracy. This is a system based on the opposite of the consent of the governed. (For a more detailed treatment of the People’s Republic of China and the repression of its democracy movement see Country Studies in Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Association.)

Before Consent of the Governed 

Until the original thirteen American states asserted the principle of consent of the governed as self-evident, it had been applied only rarely in the world’s annals. For most of recorded history, people lived under different types of dictatorship, usually a form of autocracy, the rule of a single leader exercising unlimited power. Sometimes, the ruler was the best warrior, able to seize power over a group or nation (such as Genghis Khan in 13th-century Asia). Such leaders often founded hereditary monarchies, the most common form of autocracy. In most cases, the monarch was all-powerful, claiming his or her position by "divine right" (as in Europe) or by the "mandate of heaven" (as in China). The ruler was sovereign, the supreme authority of a state. The people were not citizens but subjects. They never consented to be governed, yet owed their total obedience and loyalty to the ruler. Disobedience was punished, often by pain of death. In some countries, kings or emperors agreed to limit their powers in response to the demands of landowners and noblemen who had gained substantial wealth, establishing a system of consent by the aristocracy. England's Magna Carta (Great Charter) of 1215 is among the most famous agreements limiting the powers of a king. It guaranteed that the king and his successors would not violate the acknowledged rights and privileges of the aristocracy, the clergy, and even more limited property owners in towns (see also Section 3: Constitutional Limits).

But even when its powers were limited, monarchy meant arbitrary and unrepresentative rule for most subjects, locking them into a life of servitude. The idea that the people were themselves sovereign was — and in many places remains — revolutionary. 

Consent of the Governed: A Positive Definition

The United States of America was the first modern state formed around the principle of consent of the governed. The term implies that the people of a country or territory have the right of self-rule and must consent, either in a direct referendum or through elected representatives, to the establishment of their own government. In most modern cases, the form of the state is a republic, or rule by voting citizens within an agreed-upon constitutional and legal framework. But some monarchies also operate with the consent of the governed, as in the United Kingdom, where over time the monarch has given up most political and administrative functions to elected officials and the government is formed through regular elections.

An original consent of the governed —  the adoption of a new constitution or the formation of a new state — is usually achieved through direct democracy such as a referendum or plebiscite. But it may also be achieved through elected representative institutions, such as an existing legislature or a special constitutional assembly. In some cases, the establishment of a new governmental system requires a "supermajority," from three-fifths to three-quarters, to convey overwhelming popular assent, but often a simple majority suffices. (For example, the U.S. Constitution required the approval of ratifying conventions in at least nine of the thirteen states for it to take effect. An amendment to the constitution must be passed by three-quarters of the states either by a majority vote of their state legislatures or in ratifying state conventions. Yet, many countries have used simple popular majorities in national referenda to establish both national and supranational structures. What remains fixed is the principle that the people are sovereign and must provide their fundamental consent to be governed.

The most common form of democracy is a parliamentary system, in which the executive branch is controlled by the political party or coalition of political parties that wins a majority of seats in parliament and is able to form a government. Unlike in the American presidential system, parliamentary systems have few constitutional checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches. The system relies heavily on the oversight of the opposition party or parties in parliament. Once a form of democratic government is established, elections are the main vehicle for renewing the consent of the governed. Each election is an opportunity for the people to change their leaders and the policies of the state. When a particular government loses the people's confidence, they have the right to replace it. The legislature may pass laws to reform the system within the bounds of the constitution; if laws are insufficient, the people and their representatives can choose to modify or replace the constitution itself.

Parliamentary systems provide a more direct consent of the governed through elections, whether in "first past the post" systems like the United Kingdom (where seats in parliament are won by the person with the most votes, whether or not it is a majority) or in proportional representation or mixed systems (where most seats are determined proporionally according to the national vote by party list). Oddly, the United States of America, the world's oldest continuous democracy, does not offer direct but inderect election for its national office through an Electoral College. While the Electoral College vote usually has coincided with the national vote, in 2016, for the second time in 16 years, the national vote winner (by 2.85 million) was denied the office of president in favor of the winner of the electoral college vote, which was achieved by several narrowly won victories in key states.

Consent of the Governed: A Negative Definition

As noted above, in defining consent of the governed, it is helpful to examine cases where it is absent. Modern authoritarian regimes offer many clear examples of what it means to have a system without the people’s consent. As is reviewed in the Country Studies of Democracy Web, these regimes take various forms, including autocracy (such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan), monarchy (such as Morocco and Saudi Arabia), theocracy (such as the Islamic Republic of Iran), military rule (common to Latin American dictatorships of the 1970s and ‘80s, as in Bolivia, Chile and Guatemala), and apartheid (or rule by a racial minority as occurred in South Africa). But it is typical for all forms of authoritarian government to deny freedom to the majority of people, exercise power arbitrarily, and act ruthlessly to keep themselves in power. A distinct category of dictatorship is totalitarianism, which is based on a comprehensive ideology (such as fascism or communism) and a disciplined party apparatus. These regimes are defined by their total social control over the population, typically achieved through purges of public institutions, general repression, and mass execution. Historical examples include Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong. Current examples are Cuba and North Korea.

Many modern authoritarian rulers have seized power by citing the need to safeguard the integrity of the state against supposed external threats or to maintain political stability against unruly elements in society. Communist dictatorships purported to achieve economic and social rights of the population by exterminating the former ruling elites. What both types of regimes generally achieve is oppression and poverty. Often such arbitrary rule has led to famine, war, and even genocide.

Although most authoritarian rulers seize power through violent revolution or a coup d'état, they claim to have the consent of the governed. But they rarely allow free and fair elections or referendums to test their claims — what are called elections are controlled and manipulated by fraud. When a relatively free election or referendum has actually been allowed by a dictatorship, the people generally vote against it (as in Chile in 1988, Poland in 1989, and Serbia in 2000). There are some cases, such as Nazi Germany, in which a modern dictatorship has been described as coming to power through fair elections. In fact, the Nazi Party won only a parliamentary minority in the elections of 1933. Hitler, once given office, seized total power through intimidation and thuggery in what amounted to a coup d'état (see Country Study of Germany).

The Right to Rebellion

Implied in the principle of consent of the governed is the right to withdraw that consent — to overthrow a regime that abuses the people through tyrannical, arbitrary, incompetent, or unrepresentative rule. This was the right that the British philosopher John Locke asserted was intrinsic to a system of natural law (see History), and that the thirteen American states invoked against King George III in 1776. 

Two centuries later, the people of Eastern Europe rose up to assert the same right against an oppressive Communist system. But Locke's principle is not a general right of rebellion or revolution; he did not advocate anarchy. The cause of rebellion — or the withdrawal of consent — must rest on the violation of the natural rights of citizens, that is, on the establishment of tyranny. Thus, in 1860, President Abraham Lincoln asserted the opposite principle, that a minority of states could not be allowed to rebel to preserve slavery (the tyranny of a minority) and thus destroy a constitutional system established on a representative, democratic system of governance. Such a republic had to be preserved against an anti-constitutional and anti-democratic rebellion.

Today, violent rebellion has come to be seen as a last resort. In most modern cases of the overthrow of dictatorship, from anticolonial movements to anti-Communist movements, peaceful protest and civic resistance has been a more successful form of "rebellion" than the violent overthrow of a government, especially for the purpose of establishing a democracy based on consent of the governed.

Minorities Withdrawing Consent

What happens when a subjugated minority asserts the right to withdraw its consent to be governed by the will of the majority? This has occurred in a number of places where ethnic or religious minorities desire independence from dominant and usually oppressive ethnic or religious majorities. In general, the world has recognized the right of self-determination for oppressed peoples to form their own self-governing regions or independent states, as was the case recently in Kosovo and East Timor. As well, in Sweden, Italy and other countries, minorities have gained increased autonomy without demanding independence. But for some minorities seeking independence or autonomy, the world has been less supportive of the assertion of the right of self-determination and has failed to prevent the suppression of rebellions, even when the government has resorted to mass killings or genocide. This has been the case in Chechnya and Darfur in the Sudan. Despite several international treaties and documents defining nationality and minority rights, the world’s nations have shown little consistency in this area (see also Majority Rule, Minority Rights and Human Rights).

Page 2

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed . . ."

Declaration of Independence, United States of America, 1776

The most fundamental concept of democracy is the idea that government exists to secure the rights of the people and must be based on the consent of the governed. Today, the quote above from the U.S. Declaration of Independence is considered a maxim of the ideal form of government. 

The essential meaning of “consent of the governed” can perhaps best be understood by examining countries where it is lacking. China is one example. In the spring of 1989, university students organized a prolonged series of protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square to demand truth, accountability, freedom, and democracy from their government. They adopted as their symbol a likeness of the Statue of Liberty, calling it the Goddess of Liberty. Millions of people joined the students in Beijing and other cities across China to demand a voice in the government that had long been used to deny people's freedom.

Since the Communist Party had seized power in 1949, those who dared to oppose its dictates had been subject to arrest or worse. The regime's principal authority to govern was the Communist principle of "democratic centralism," meaning that the decisions of the party’s central leadership — and ultimately the party leader — could not be questioned. The Communist Party's repressive policies and ideological campaigns caused millions of deaths through famine, execution, and violent political purges.

The Chinese people consented to none of this. The communist regime had been built through revolution and terror; no free election had ever been held in the People's Republic. And in 1989 the Chinese people demanded democratic change. On June 4, Deng Xiaoping, the top Communist leader, ordered the use of force to put down the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and throughout China. The world saw students stand before tanks to resist, but ultimately they were helpless to prevent the mass killings and arrests that ensued. Nearly 30 years later, the Communist Party remains the supreme authority. The students and workers who sought democracy were imprisoned, expelled from school or fired from work, forced into exile, pressured to recant their views, and even denied housing. Until now, repression of human rights has effectively prevented any re-emergence of the popular demand for democracy. This is a system based on the opposite of the consent of the governed. (For a more detailed treatment of the People’s Republic of China and the repression of its democracy movement see Country Studies in Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Association.)

Before Consent of the Governed 

Until the original thirteen American states asserted the principle of consent of the governed as self-evident, it had been applied only rarely in the world’s annals. For most of recorded history, people lived under different types of dictatorship, usually a form of autocracy, the rule of a single leader exercising unlimited power. Sometimes, the ruler was the best warrior, able to seize power over a group or nation (such as Genghis Khan in 13th-century Asia). Such leaders often founded hereditary monarchies, the most common form of autocracy. In most cases, the monarch was all-powerful, claiming his or her position by "divine right" (as in Europe) or by the "mandate of heaven" (as in China). The ruler was sovereign, the supreme authority of a state. The people were not citizens but subjects. They never consented to be governed, yet owed their total obedience and loyalty to the ruler. Disobedience was punished, often by pain of death. In some countries, kings or emperors agreed to limit their powers in response to the demands of landowners and noblemen who had gained substantial wealth, establishing a system of consent by the aristocracy. England's Magna Carta (Great Charter) of 1215 is among the most famous agreements limiting the powers of a king. It guaranteed that the king and his successors would not violate the acknowledged rights and privileges of the aristocracy, the clergy, and even more limited property owners in towns (see also Section 3: Constitutional Limits).

But even when its powers were limited, monarchy meant arbitrary and unrepresentative rule for most subjects, locking them into a life of servitude. The idea that the people were themselves sovereign was — and in many places remains — revolutionary. 

Consent of the Governed: A Positive Definition

The United States of America was the first modern state formed around the principle of consent of the governed. The term implies that the people of a country or territory have the right of self-rule and must consent, either in a direct referendum or through elected representatives, to the establishment of their own government. In most modern cases, the form of the state is a republic, or rule by voting citizens within an agreed-upon constitutional and legal framework. But some monarchies also operate with the consent of the governed, as in the United Kingdom, where over time the monarch has given up most political and administrative functions to elected officials and the government is formed through regular elections.

An original consent of the governed —  the adoption of a new constitution or the formation of a new state — is usually achieved through direct democracy such as a referendum or plebiscite. But it may also be achieved through elected representative institutions, such as an existing legislature or a special constitutional assembly. In some cases, the establishment of a new governmental system requires a "supermajority," from three-fifths to three-quarters, to convey overwhelming popular assent, but often a simple majority suffices. (For example, the U.S. Constitution required the approval of ratifying conventions in at least nine of the thirteen states for it to take effect. An amendment to the constitution must be passed by three-quarters of the states either by a majority vote of their state legislatures or in ratifying state conventions. Yet, many countries have used simple popular majorities in national referenda to establish both national and supranational structures. What remains fixed is the principle that the people are sovereign and must provide their fundamental consent to be governed.

The most common form of democracy is a parliamentary system, in which the executive branch is controlled by the political party or coalition of political parties that wins a majority of seats in parliament and is able to form a government. Unlike in the American presidential system, parliamentary systems have few constitutional checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches. The system relies heavily on the oversight of the opposition party or parties in parliament. Once a form of democratic government is established, elections are the main vehicle for renewing the consent of the governed. Each election is an opportunity for the people to change their leaders and the policies of the state. When a particular government loses the people's confidence, they have the right to replace it. The legislature may pass laws to reform the system within the bounds of the constitution; if laws are insufficient, the people and their representatives can choose to modify or replace the constitution itself.

Parliamentary systems provide a more direct consent of the governed through elections, whether in "first past the post" systems like the United Kingdom (where seats in parliament are won by the person with the most votes, whether or not it is a majority) or in proportional representation or mixed systems (where most seats are determined proporionally according to the national vote by party list). Oddly, the United States of America, the world's oldest continuous democracy, does not offer direct but inderect election for its national office through an Electoral College. While the Electoral College vote usually has coincided with the national vote, in 2016, for the second time in 16 years, the national vote winner (by 2.85 million) was denied the office of president in favor of the winner of the electoral college vote, which was achieved by several narrowly won victories in key states.

Consent of the Governed: A Negative Definition

As noted above, in defining consent of the governed, it is helpful to examine cases where it is absent. Modern authoritarian regimes offer many clear examples of what it means to have a system without the people’s consent. As is reviewed in the Country Studies of Democracy Web, these regimes take various forms, including autocracy (such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan), monarchy (such as Morocco and Saudi Arabia), theocracy (such as the Islamic Republic of Iran), military rule (common to Latin American dictatorships of the 1970s and ‘80s, as in Bolivia, Chile and Guatemala), and apartheid (or rule by a racial minority as occurred in South Africa). But it is typical for all forms of authoritarian government to deny freedom to the majority of people, exercise power arbitrarily, and act ruthlessly to keep themselves in power. A distinct category of dictatorship is totalitarianism, which is based on a comprehensive ideology (such as fascism or communism) and a disciplined party apparatus. These regimes are defined by their total social control over the population, typically achieved through purges of public institutions, general repression, and mass execution. Historical examples include Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong. Current examples are Cuba and North Korea.

Many modern authoritarian rulers have seized power by citing the need to safeguard the integrity of the state against supposed external threats or to maintain political stability against unruly elements in society. Communist dictatorships purported to achieve economic and social rights of the population by exterminating the former ruling elites. What both types of regimes generally achieve is oppression and poverty. Often such arbitrary rule has led to famine, war, and even genocide.

Although most authoritarian rulers seize power through violent revolution or a coup d'état, they claim to have the consent of the governed. But they rarely allow free and fair elections or referendums to test their claims — what are called elections are controlled and manipulated by fraud. When a relatively free election or referendum has actually been allowed by a dictatorship, the people generally vote against it (as in Chile in 1988, Poland in 1989, and Serbia in 2000). There are some cases, such as Nazi Germany, in which a modern dictatorship has been described as coming to power through fair elections. In fact, the Nazi Party won only a parliamentary minority in the elections of 1933. Hitler, once given office, seized total power through intimidation and thuggery in what amounted to a coup d'état (see Country Study of Germany).

The Right to Rebellion

Implied in the principle of consent of the governed is the right to withdraw that consent — to overthrow a regime that abuses the people through tyrannical, arbitrary, incompetent, or unrepresentative rule. This was the right that the British philosopher John Locke asserted was intrinsic to a system of natural law (see History), and that the thirteen American states invoked against King George III in 1776. 

Two centuries later, the people of Eastern Europe rose up to assert the same right against an oppressive Communist system. But Locke's principle is not a general right of rebellion or revolution; he did not advocate anarchy. The cause of rebellion — or the withdrawal of consent — must rest on the violation of the natural rights of citizens, that is, on the establishment of tyranny. Thus, in 1860, President Abraham Lincoln asserted the opposite principle, that a minority of states could not be allowed to rebel to preserve slavery (the tyranny of a minority) and thus destroy a constitutional system established on a representative, democratic system of governance. Such a republic had to be preserved against an anti-constitutional and anti-democratic rebellion.

Today, violent rebellion has come to be seen as a last resort. In most modern cases of the overthrow of dictatorship, from anticolonial movements to anti-Communist movements, peaceful protest and civic resistance has been a more successful form of "rebellion" than the violent overthrow of a government, especially for the purpose of establishing a democracy based on consent of the governed.

Minorities Withdrawing Consent

What happens when a subjugated minority asserts the right to withdraw its consent to be governed by the will of the majority? This has occurred in a number of places where ethnic or religious minorities desire independence from dominant and usually oppressive ethnic or religious majorities. In general, the world has recognized the right of self-determination for oppressed peoples to form their own self-governing regions or independent states, as was the case recently in Kosovo and East Timor. As well, in Sweden, Italy and other countries, minorities have gained increased autonomy without demanding independence. But for some minorities seeking independence or autonomy, the world has been less supportive of the assertion of the right of self-determination and has failed to prevent the suppression of rebellions, even when the government has resorted to mass killings or genocide. This has been the case in Chechnya and Darfur in the Sudan. Despite several international treaties and documents defining nationality and minority rights, the world’s nations have shown little consistency in this area (see also Majority Rule, Minority Rights and Human Rights).

Page 3

Chenoweth, Erica and Stephen, Maria J. Why Civic Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Non-Violent Conflict (2011). New York: Columbia University Press (link).
     See also original essay, "Why Civil Resistance Works," International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), 7–44.

Crick, Bernard. Democracy: A Very Short Introduction (2003). New York: Oxford University Press.

Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan (1951). New York: Penguin. See also “Thomas Hobbes: Moral and Political Philosophy,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Declaration of Independence, National Government Archives.

Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought). See also "John Locke: Political Philosophy," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought). See also "Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778)," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

South Africa

Economist magazine: Topics Index: South Africa.
   Selected Article: Nelson Mandela: Invictus (Dec. 14, 2013).
The New York Times: World Topics: South Africa.
   See especially obituary of Nelson Mandela.

Carlin, John. Playing the Enemy: Nelson Mandela and the Game that Made a Nation (2009). New York: Penguin Books Reprint Edition.

Lodge, Tom. Mandela: A Critical Life. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Mandela, Nelson.
   Address to the People of Cape Town on the occasion of his inauguration as state president, Cape Town, May 9, 1994.
   A Long Walk to Freedom: An Autobiography (1995). South Africa: Macdonald Purnell Publishers.

Paton, Alan. Cry the Beloved Country, A Novel (2003). New York: Scribner.

Right2Know Campaign (home page)

U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports (go to most current year Country Reports and drop down menu for South Africa).

Recommended Films
   "Amandla!: A Revolution in Four-Part Harmony" (2002), a film directed by Lee Hirsch.   "Tsotsi" (2005), a film directed by Gavin Hood (UK Film & TV Production Company).   "Invictus" (2009), directed by Clint Eastwood.

   "The Long Walk to Freedom" (2013), directed by Justin Chadwick.

Bolivia

Economist magazine: Topics Index: Bolivia.
   Selected Article: “From Tap to Socket: Nationalizing Utilities in Bolivia,” Jan. 19, 2013.
The New York Times: World Topics: Bolivia.

New York Review of Books
   Guillermoprieto, Alma. "The New Bolivia?” and “The New Bolivia II." (Aug. 10 and Sept. 21, 2006).

U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports (go to current year Country Report drop down menu for Bolivia).

Iran

Economist magazine: Topics Index: Iran. See e.g.,
   Selected Article: “Aya-toiling: Iran’s Banned Trade Unions,” (April 20, 2013).
   Selected Article: “Get it Off, Put it On: A Culture War” [over leggings], (June 14, 2014).
The New York Times: World Topics: Iran.

Bakhash, Shaul. "Letter from Evin Prison." New York Review of Books (Sept. 22, 2005).

Ebadi, Shirin. “Nobel Lecture” (December 3, 2003).

International Human Rights Campaign for Iran (home page). See, e.g., 
   "Happy Video Youths Receive Suspended Flogging and Prison Sentences” (Sept. 18, 2014).
   “Two Poets Sentenced to Flogging and 11 and 9½  Years in Prison” (Oct. 15, 2015).

Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (home page). See, e.g.,
   “Tour of Ward 2A of Evin Prison.”

Nafisi, Azar. Reading Lolita in Tehran (2003). New York: Random House.

Satrapi, Marjane. Persepolis: A Story of a Childhood (2003), a graphic novel. New York: Pantheon Books.

U.S. Department of State Human Rights Country Reports (go to current year Country Report drop down menu for Iran).

Recommended Films
   "Boycott" (1986), a film directed by Mohsen Makhmalbaf (Makhmalbaf Film House).   "Children of Heaven" (1997), a film directed by Majid Majidi.   "The Color of Paradise" (1999), a film directed by Majid Majidi ( Varahonar Company).

   "Persepolis" (2007), an animated film written and directed by Marjane Satrapi and Vincente Parannaud.

Page 4

Rankings in Freedom in the World 2016. Status: Not Free. Freedom Ranking: 6; Political Rights: 6; Civil Liberties: 6. 

Summary

The territory of Iran, previously known as Persia, was ruled by monarchical dynasties or occupied and dominated by foreign powers for nearly all of its recorded history dating to classical times. There were only brief periods in the 20th century during which there was some measure of parliamentary democracy. In 1979, a revolution against the repressive regime of Shah Pahlevi, inspired by the exiled cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, resulted in the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a theocratic government. Since then, Iran’s clerical rulers have maintained a strong grip on the country's politics, economy, society, and culture. Pro-democracy movements that emerged in the late 1990s and in 2009 were suppressed by force and repression. Today, dissidents oppose the regime and its policies at risk of their life and freedom. In the 2013 presidential elections, the cleric and lawyer Hassan Rouhani, the regime’s former negotiator regarding its nuclear program and considered a moderate for advocating better relations with the West, won a large victory over other harder-line candidates.

Iran is the 17th-largest country in the world by area (slightly smaller than Alaska) and 18th largest by population (approximately 79 million people in 2015). It borders seven countries (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan) and three bodies of water (the Caspian Sea to the north and the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to the south). The economy is dominated by oil: Iran possesses the world's fourth-largest oil reserves. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran ranked 29th in the world in 2014 in total GDP in nominal measurements (at about $440 billion). In per capita GDP, however, Iran ranked much worse, indicating wide disparities in Iran’s distribution of wealth: 93rd in nominal GNI (gross national income) per capita in 2015 ($5,048 a year). Poverty and unemployment rates remain in double digits. 

Iran’s growth rates and economic conditions worsened over the previous decade due to a severe sanctions regime, including bans on oil sales, imposed by the United Nations to deter Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. After prolonged U.N.-authorized negotiations with the P5+1 group (the 5 members of the Security Council and Germany), Iran agreed in July 2015 to restrict its nuclear program to peaceful purposes for fifteen years in exchange for relief from international sanctions, including on significant frozen assets held in international banks.

History

The Iranian state dates back to Cyrus II, who united several kingdoms into the Persian Empire in 550 BC. Known as Cyrus the Great, he also conquered most of the Middle East and Asia Minor to form the world’s first extended empire. Uniquely for that time, Cyrus instituted a policy of religious tolerance, which included ordering the return of Jews held in captivity in Babylon. He also issued the Cylinder of Cyrus, which lists allowances and freedoms that Cyrus granted to nations under his rule, including the right to reject his rule altogether. To show the Cylinder’s historical importance as the earliest known example of limited rule and tolerance of local religions and customs, the United Nations displays a replica inscribed on its headquarters building in New York City.

From Alexander to the Qajars

Cyrus's Achaemenid dynasty fell to Alexander the Great in 330 BC. After Alexander's death, one of his generals founded the new Seleucid dynasty, which controlled much of present-day Iran. Seleucid rule was followed by two long-lasting Persian dynasties, the Parthian (247 BC–AD 224) and the Sassanid (AD 224–642). Muslim Arabs invaded in 636 and largely subdued Persia by 650, converting it to Islam. Thereafter, the country was ruled by a series of Arab and Turkic dynasties, until being conquered in the 13th century by the Mongol leader Genghis Khan, whose dominion stretched from China. After more than two centuries of Mongol and Turkic rule, the Safavid dynasty was established in northwestern Iran in 1502, which declared Shiite Islam as the official religion. Iran today remains predominantly Shiite. The Safavid dynasty fell in the early 19th century, ultimately succeeded by the Qajar dynasty. 

The Constitutional Revolution

The country’s history of empires and dynasties was interrupted at the beginning of the 20th century by the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–06, which established Iran's first elected parliament and a constitutional monarchy. The Qajar shahs, however, resisted parliamentary government and drew on Russian and British influence to limit constitutional rule. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement delineated respective spheres of control in Iran’s south and north to Britain and Russia, with a "neutral" area in the center. In the south, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established by agreement with Shah Qajar to extract energy resources near the Persian Gulf. The efforts of Constitutionalists to defend the parliament’s powers were hampered by World War I, which saw increased Russian and British military presence. Iran’s parliament again asserted its powers after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, which weakened Russia’s imperial influence, and also later successfully rejected Britain’s attempt gain greater control over the country. 

The Restoration of the Shahs—and Their Final Fall 

A young army officer named Reza Khan organized a coup in 1921 and four years later he had the parliament officially depose the now largely powerless Qajar dynasty and declare him the new monarch under the name Reza Shah Pahlevi. Over the following years, he introduced a number of reforms in an effort to modernize Iran, while at the same time maintaining a heavy repressive hand to stifle internal dissent. The Shah’s refusal to help the Allies in World War II led Great Britain and the Soviet Union to invade the country, now formally named Iran, in 1941. The occupiers forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlevi.

Under pressure from the United States, allied troops withdrew from the country by 1946, after which parliament again reasserted its powers. In 1951, the parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry, which would have ended the British role in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. A nationalist proponent of the plan, Muhammad Mossadegh, became prime minister despite opposition by the shah, who was forced into temporary exile. In 1953, monarchists and military officers, with support from the United States and Britain, returned the shah from exile to oust Mossadegh. The shah re-established full control over the state and signed an agreement for a joint British, Dutch, French, and US oil consortium to develop Iran's reserves. 

Under Shah Pahlevi’s rule, Iran began a period of modernization, which included land reform and improving women’s rights. Measures to open the country, however, were accompanied by a system of increasing political repression and torture carried out by the notorious SAVAK secret police forces. Repression and growing economic inequality created greater and greater resentment within the population and ultimately led to a popular revolution in early 1979 that resulted in the creation of the Islamic Republic.

Consent of the Governed

For most of its history, Iran was governed by either foreign empires or hereditary dynasties exercising absolute control. The Constitutional Revolution of 1905–06 was thwarted by foreign interference and the re-establishment of monarchical rule in 1924. Following World War II, the nationalist government led by Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh was ousted in 1953 by Shah Pahlevi, backed by the US and the United Kingdom. There was secular opposition to the Shah’s rule, but the Islamic movement led by an exiled cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, also gained strength as the Shah’s modernization campaign failed to improve the economy and became associated with inequality, corruption, and harsh repression. Joint secular and religious opposition protests caused Shah Pahlevi to flee the country in January 1979. In early February, Ayatollah Khomeini, returned from Paris and was greeted by a cheering crowd of two to three million. He quickly established an interim government that supplanted a caretaker regime. He then called for a quick plebiscite to establish an Islamic Republic without debate over the content of the constitution or established democratic procedures to ensure a fair plebiscite. An authoritarian theocracy, a state ruled by religious leaders, quickly replaced the secular authoritarian regime.

The Islamic Republic

The plebiscite approved an interim constitution based on the principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship by the Islamic jurist). Ayatollah Khomeini became Supreme Leader and cemented theocratic rule through amendments to the constitution that effectively prevent the people from changing their government or constitution. Formally, there is a division of government into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, with general elections for president and a parliament (called the Majlis), which are staggered every four years. All branches of government, however, are effectively overseen by the Supreme Leader, a high cleric selected by an Assembly of Experts made up only of high clerics. 

The Supreme Leader 

The constitution’s establishment of theocracy is complete. For one, the Supreme Leader is granted the power to appoint the heads of the key levers of power: the military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the chief of the judiciary, and the head of state television and radio. The Supreme Leader also controls the appointment of the Guardian Council, which is tasked with vetting political candidates for all elected offices and reviewing legislation passed by the parliament. In 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini created another body, the Council of Expediency, fully appointed by the Supreme Leader, with power to resolve disputes between the parliament and the Guardian Council. While the constitution formally establishes some separation of constitutional responsibilities for running the government, in practice the Supreme Leader has supervisory powers over all parts of government. During his rule, Khomeini exercised enormous influence. He forced out the initial secular prime minister and immediately set Iran on an anti-Western course by encouraging the takeover of the US embassy in 1979 and deliberately encouraging a deep paranoia of Western, and particularly US, influence. He imposed a strict set of Islamic laws that banned informal contact between unrelated men and women, forced women to cover their heads and bodies in public, among many other restrictions. 

The constitution stipulated that after Khomeini died, a new supreme leader would be chosen by the Assembly of Experts. This is a body of senior clerics supposedly “elected” by popular vote in staggered terms of eight years. In practice, there is no real choice since all candidates for the Assembly are vetted by the Guardian Council. (In 2015, even Khomeini’s grandson, an imam reported to have more moderate views, was blocked from running for the Assembly of Experts.) Upon Khomeini's death in 1989, the Assembly appointed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as supreme leader. While the Assembly of Experts has the responsibility to review the Supreme Leader’s actions and retains the formal power to recall him if he violates the constitution, the Supreme Leader’s overall powers to control the membership of both the Guardian Council (and thus the Assembly of Experts), negates the formal power to change leaders.

A Reform Movement Is Thwarted 

In the mid-1990s, a reformist movement arose around student protests and propelled the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997. While approved by the Guardian Council, he had campaigned as a moderate for president against harder-line backers of theocratic rule. Using their limited powers, Khatami and his allies in parliament took steps to liberalize the media, encourage the expression of opinion, allow use of the internet, free up parts of the economy, and even ease enforcement of Islamic social controls. Reformist parties supporting Khatami won some 80 percent of the vote in the 1999 municipal elections and about two-thirds of the seats in the Majlis in the 2000 elections. In 2001, Khatami won reelection as president with nearly 80 percent of the vote.

The regime’s theocratic institutions, however, began to re-assert their power at the direction of the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Religious Council and the Expediency Council vetoed legislation and counteract reforms through decrees. For the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Guardian Council struck 2,000 reformist candidates from the electoral list for parliament for violating “principles of sovereignty and national unity” or “questioning the Islamic basis of the Republic.” After regaining control over the Majlis, the theocratic leadership then ensured the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, previously the mayor of Tehran and considered a hardline supporter of the Iranian Revolution, in the 2005 presidential elections. Vote rigging ensured the defeat of a relatively moderate cleric, former President Rafsanjani.

The Ministry of Security, directly responsible to the Supreme Leader, carried out increasingly repressive policies, ordering the closure of reformist media, non-governmental organizations, and political parties and arresting outspoken journalists, human rights lawyers, and students. Independent trade union leaders were imprisoned after organizing strikes against the government’s economic and wage policies. At the same time, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the most important vehicle for consolidating the revolutionary regime in 1979–81, resumed its role as the regime’s ultimate enforcer. It aggressively sought out violators of Islamic proscriptions and national security laws. Anyone arrested by the IRGC is tried before its revolutionary tribunals, not the civil courts, and so has no rights to due process. The IRGC targeted women through enforcement of Islamic restrictions on movement, attire, social contact, and political representation. Students were arrested for minor religious infractions, such as allegedly violating fasting rules during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. Three prominent Iranian Americans were arrested for conspiring to foment revolution, part of a campaign to “root out foreign influences.” Although the three were later released after an international campaign, dual citizens have continued to face arrest and charges of treason.

Civil society and cultural and human rights activists continued to organize opposition to the government’s policies. This was symbolized by the efforts of human rights lawyer Shirin Ebadi. Her non-violent advocacy for women’s and human rights had earned her the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize (see link to her Nobel Lecture in Resources). She used the resulting international recognition to further her work, but in the face of death threats she went into exile in 2009 and currently lives in London.

A Second Revolution Is Crushed

Ahmadinejad campaigned on populist promises to redistribute oil revenues to the poor through subsidies and reduced-rate loans, but these pledges went largely unfilled. His focus as president was to foster Iran’s nuclear weapons program, harden a confrontational stance towards the West, and call for the destruction of Israel. Despite the threat of sanctions, Iran continued to refuse cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its nuclear program to ensure it was not being used to develop nuclear weapons — as was widely suspected and later confirmed by the IAEA. In 2006, following a report by the IAEA detailing Iran’s lack of cooperation and its likely development of nuclear weapons, the United Nations initiated sanctions on Iran that increased in severity over the next years.  In the 2009 presidential elections, the Guardian Council approved three candidates to challenge Ahmadinejad, who appeared to be still favored by the theocratic leadership. Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister, campaigned as a reformer and emerged as the main challenger by confronting Ahmadinejad in televised debates. Mousavi gained wide public support as a result but the regime brooked no possibility of defeat. Immediately after polls closed the government-controlled media announced Ahmadinejad as the winner with nearly 70 percent of the vote against Mousavi’s 28 percent. The regime’s blatant fraud prompted huge protests involving hundreds of thousands of people demanding democratic change. Organized in part through widespread use of cell phones and social media, the protest movement (called the Green Revolution) lasted for months, but eventually dissipated in the face of pervasive police repression. Protests were dispersed by force and at least 72 people were killed. Mousavi, his wife, herself a prominent intellectual, and Mehdi Karroubi, a fellow reformist candidate who had thrown his support to Mousavi, were placed under house arrest (where they have remained). 

Current Issues

In response to the 2009 protests, Green Revolution leaders and hundreds of other activists were imprisoned, non-governmental organizations were closed, and students who participated in the protests were expelled from universities. In addition to holding hundreds of political prisoners, the government has continued to imprison thousands of people on charges of committing religious crimes such as moharebeh (“enmity against God”). Revolutionary Tribunals sentence people not only to harsh prison terms but also to severe floggings (up to 100 lashes) and, in many cases, execution, usually by public hangings. (Next to China, Iran has the second highest number of executions in the world — and the highest rate per capita.)

Presidential elections held in 2013 were considered significant for the election of Hassan Rouhani, who won 51 percent against seven candidates allowed to run by the Guardian Council (it excluded 600 other candidates). Rouhani, although he is considered close to Khamenei and served as the former chief negotiator in international negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, pledged a reformist government that would adopt comparatively more liberal policies and attempt to ease strained relations with the West. Rouhani also signaled willingness to negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program, a change that appeared to be the result of the increasing economic impact on Iran of international sanctions, which now included strict bans on arms and oil sales, international bank transactions, and freezing of assets held by the IRGC, among others. President Barack Obama repeatedly stated the US’s position never to allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons, including by military means if necessary. However, President Obama had also made clear willingness to negotiate an agreement that prevented Iran from obtaining such weapons. In fact, Rouhani’s public position during and after the presidential campaign reflected initial behind-the-scenes discussions between the Obama administration and Iranian representatives aimed at such negotiations that began in 2011, as the harsher sanctions began to take hold. 

Following a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September 2013, two months after his election, Rouhani engaged in a highly symbolic telephone call with President Obama. The call initiated the formal renewal of talks with the P5+1 group (the five U.N. Security Council members and Germany) on Iran’s nuclear program. After reaching an interim agreement, a final Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed between Iran and the P5+1 group in July 2015 and its terms have been generally carried out. Under the agreement, Iran agreed to significantly reduce its levels of enriched uranium, mothball two-thirds of its centrifuges capable of enriching high-grade uranium and plutonium, incapacitate its plutonium reactor, and allow inspections of its nuclear facilities, although with notification, for a period of fifteen years. In exchange, the P5+1 agreed to the lifting of the international sanctions regime, including release of frozen international assets estimated at $100 billion and the eventual lifting of the arms sales embargo. The agreement was opposed by two key US allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia, which fear that Iran will not ultimately abandon its nuclear weapons program and is just using the agreement to gain economic relief from sanctions. It also has been opposed by members of the US Congress. The IAEA, however, confirmed that Iran had carried out the terms of the deal by early January 2016, triggering the process to end international sanctions.

At the same time, the Iranian government released three dual US-Iranian citizens, including Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian, who had been sentenced by Revolutionary Guards tribunals to harsh prison terms for “violating national security” or taking part in alleged foreign conspiracies. In exchange, the US released seven Iranian Americans sentenced to espionage and violating the international sanctions. The releases appeared to signal further easing of tensions with Iran, however the government has subsequently arrested other dual US-Iranian citizens, including a prominent energy contractor, and temporarily seized an American navy vessel and held its sailors under arms for entering Iranian waters.

Iran’s nuclear diplomacy did not otherwise alter Iran’s foreign policy. Since his inauguration, Rouhani has reiterated Iran’s hostility towards Israel, stating that the “the Zionist regime” was “a sore sitting on the Islamic world.” Similar statements are frequently issued by high-level officials and clerics. Iran has continued to finance, train and equip radical and terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, including its missile attacks on Israel in 2014, and to back Syria’s Assad regime, which is dominated by a fellow Shi’ite sect, against a popular uprising (see Country Studies of Israel and Syria). Iran has also continued ballistic missile tests up to a range of 2,000 since the agreement was signed, prompting some US lawmakers to  call for imposing separate sanctions on potential delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction.

Internally, Rouhani took several modest initiatives to liberalize the economy and social life, at least compared to the previous administration. Soon after his inauguration, he eased some media and internet restrictions, released a dozen political prisoners, and urged the restoration of students who had been expelled from the university for political activity in 2012–13. He also expressed disapproval of arresting people for minor infractions of religious prohibitions, including the making of a video, “Happy in Teheran,” in which seven youths danced on a rooftop to the popular Pharell Williams song, “Happy” (see links in Resources). Nevertheless, a Revolutionary Tribunal court sentenced the seven youths to nine-months to one-year prison terms and 91 lashes, with sentences suspended so long as the youths did not engage in any additional “illicit relations” or violate other Islamic law.

Overall, Freedom House’s Surveys of Freedom in the World report that there is little change in respect for human rights and continues to rank Iran among the world’s “not free” countries. The Supreme Leader and the theocracy’s main institutions of control continue to exert dominant power. The Expediency Council has rejected several reform laws, while the Guardian Council rejected more than 6,000 candidates for parliamentary elections held in February 2016, including 3,000 candidates who were considered supporters of the limited reform course proposed by President Rouhani. In the end, only a minority of seats went to Rouhani supporters and a subsequent second-round re-affirmed the dominance of the religious hierarchy, similar to municipal elections. In one case, the Guardian Council declared that one independent woman candidate, Minoo Khaleghi, would be barred from parliament because pictures (that she claimed were false) showed her not wearing a head covering while traveling to Europe and China (see New York Times articles for recent events). The case established the assertion of new powers by the Guardian Council to vet not only candidates but also elected members of the Majlis, or parliament.

Hundreds of political prisoners remain in jails or under house arrest. At the public urging of the Supreme Leader in late 2015 and early 2016, the Revolutionary Guards stepped up arrests and prosecutions for threats against national security, questioning the theocratic basis of the Islamic Republic, and infractions of religious laws. Harsh sentences, including long terms of imprisonment and floggings, have been meted out by the Revolutionary Tribunals against poets, filmmakers, students, trade unionists, and others (see, e.g. reports of the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran and other links in Resources). 

Despite a regime of comprehensive repression, Iran’s civic and pro-democracy movement continues to be active in both open and clandestine ways, aided often by Iranian exiles committed to bringing change to their country. For example, Democracy Web has been translated into Persian by the group Tavaana and is being used in its online courses involving hundreds of students inside Iran. While democracy advocates are unable to organize opposition freely, the 1997-2004 reformist movement and the 2009 protest movement showed that a large part of Iranian society supports liberalization and seeks an end to the current theocracy.

Page 5

Rankings in Freedom in the World 2016. Status: Partly Free. Freedom Rating: 3; Political Rights 3; Civil Liberties: 3.

Summary

Bolivia is a constitutional democracy that has enjoyed 35 years of civilian rule, but its difficult political history since achieving independence 1825 has left a complex legacy.

Before 1982, when it established more democratic governance, Bolivia’s political history was marked mostly by periods of harsh dictatorship and unstable rule. Until 2005 the country's political leadership, whether democratic or dictatorial, was white or mestizo. The Amerindian community was left largely unrepresented. In 2003 and 2005, mass street protests over distribution of energy wealth and other economic issues — led by Evo Morales, an Amerindian peasant leader — caused the fall of two successive governments. In December 2005, Evo Morales won the presidential election by a clear majority, becoming the first indigenous president in the country’s history. Looking to previous radical and nationalist governments from the 1930s and 1950s, Morales carried out a radical platform of oil and gas nationalization, legalization of coca (a traditional Amerindian crop), regional autonomy, and diplomatic realignment away from the U.S. and towards Cuba and Venezuela. In 2014, he won a third term in office after a controversial court decision allowed him to run for an additional term despite a constitutional two-term limit.

Bolivia is the 28th largest country in the world and the fourth largest in South America at just under 1.1 million square kilometers. Land-locked, Bolivia is bordered by five countries (Peru to the northwest, Brazil to the north and northeast, and Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile to the south). The population is small at approximately 11 million in 2016 (ranked 81st in the world). Between 56 and 70 percent of the population is ethnically indigenous, or Amerindian, with the largest groups being the Aymara and Quechua. The remaining population is white or mestizo (mixed race). While Bolivia possesses rich soil and resources, including some of the largest natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere, it is South America's poorest economy in per capita Gross National Income (GNI), ranked by the World Bank at 124th in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) measurement at $5,740 in 2013. In all of Latin America and the Caribbean, only Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua are poorer.

History

It is now believed that the Bolivian highlands have been inhabited for at least 12,000 years. The development of farming communities dates to around 3000 BC. One of the great ancient Andean civilizations, located near Bolivia's Lake Titicaca, flourished for several centuries before falling into decline after AD 1000. Later, the Aymara-speaking people who lived in the region were conquered in the 15th century by the Quechua-speaking Inca empire.

The Spanish conquest of the Inca civilization in the early to mid-1500s allowed Spain to extend its control from Central America to much of western and central Latin America, including the area of Bolivia (then called Upper Peru). Among the main discoveries was an Inca silver mine at Potosi. This area remains rich in silver and other natural resources, which have played a dominant role throughout Bolivia's history.

Spanish colonial rule was based on a system of large estates and other economic holdings (encomiendas) for exploiting silver and tin mines. These were largely worked by the indigenous population at minimal or no pay. As the representative of the Spanish monarch, the governor of the territory dispensed the mines' riches to privileged elites of Spanish descent, who came to preside over Bolivia's economic, social, and political life after the end of Spanish rule in 1825.

From Bolívar to Bolivia

Upper Peru was liberated from Spain in 1825 by the revolutionary forces of Simón Bolívar (who had already freed a swath of Spanish-controlled territory extending north to Venezuela). Bolívar oversaw the writing of the country's constitution and his top lieutenant, Antonio José de Sucre, became the first president. The new republic was named after Bolívar in part to convince him not to unite it with Peru. Although Sucre was forced from power in 1828, a new president, Andrés de Santa Cruz, stabilized the economy and organized the country's internal affairs. His ambitions to create a confederation with Peru, however, led to warfare with the two countries' neighbors. In 1839, Bolivia was defeated by Chilean forces and the confederation project ended.

From Generals to Radicals

After Santa Cruz's ouster, Bolivia experienced 40 years of erratic rule by a series of "caudillos," or strongmen. In 1879, Bolivia lost the mineral-rich Atacama region, its only point of access to the sea, to Chile in the War of the Pacific. At this time, two political parties formed: the Conservative Party, which advocated a quick peace with Chile to include mining concessions, and the Liberal Party, which rejected the peace deal and criticized Bolivia's dependence on foreign mining interests. A more liberal constitution was adopted in 1880 establishing an active bicameral legislature, but the basic law continued to restrict the vote to a small minority based on property and literacy qualifications. Several decades of relative political stability followed, although power still changed hands by force. Disastrous losses in the 1932–35 Chaco War with Paraguay led to a military seizure of power in 1935. A series of nationalist military governments proceeded to take control of Bolivia's natural resources and introduce land reform, but in 1947–52 conservatives reasserted themselves in government, stemming for a time the nationalist Left.

Consent of the Governed

The 1825 Bolívarian revolution was a revolution for the few. For 125 years afterwards, the Aymara and Quechua Amerindians as well as much of the mestizo population were dispossessed, while Bolivia's politics and economy were governed mainly by a small population of wealthy whites. It is only in Bolivia's modern history, beginning with the 1952 revolution, that consent of the governed can be considered more fully. From the mid-20th century until the early 2000s, popular and radical movements for change and military and conservative political forces have interchanged power and policies. In 2005, Amerindian leader Evo Morales, heading a popular peasant movement, was elected president to establish a more representative government, but many less representative and undemocratic features from Bolivia’s unstable political legacy remain and Morales’s rule has been marked by political conflict and some infringements on the rule of law and other freedoms.

The 1952 Revolution

In 1952, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), a leftist party first formed in 1941 and led by Víctor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo, seized power by force. The MNR had ruled from 1943 to 1946 and had won the 1951 elections, but it was prevented from assuming office by the military. In response, the MNR assembled armed civilians and portions of the security forces to seize control. Backed by peasants and workers, the new revolutionary government nationalized natural resources, enacted land reform, and abolished property and literacy requirements for voting. While influenced by nationalist and Marxist movements, the MNR government espoused democracy and did not adopt the repressive features of other leftist governments in the hemisphere.

 Military Dictatorship Returns, But Democracy Is Restored

A military coup overthrew Paz Estenssoro after his 1964 re-election. Bolivians then lived through 18 years of intermittent military dictatorship, during which essential constitutional provisions were suspended. Democratic politics were restored in 1982 following a national strike and protest movement. Siles Zuazo, one of the original MNR leaders who had served as president from 1956 to 1960, was again elected president, and in 1985 Paz Estenssoro succeeded him in the presidency. Upon entering office, however, Paz Estenssoro faced an economy in grave crisis with 10–12 percent annual drops in GDP and hyperinflation at 24,000 percent. Contrary to the MNR’s radical platform, he carried out a program of harsh economic reforms, involving stringent budget and monetary policies, and privatization of state enterprises. While these actions are credited with helping the economy back to health, many MNR supporters felt betrayed by these actions.

Coca Eradication and Historical Exclusion

In 1997, General Hugo Banzer, a conservative former military dictator, was elected president, ending the MNR’s political success. Banzer’s government inflamed social tensions by working with the U.S. government to fight cocaine production through the eradication of coca cultivation. The eradication campaign by the military brought a number of issues to a head, most notably, the exclusion and poverty of the Aymara and Quechua peoples. Until 1952, some 85 percent of the land had been held in large estates, while these two main indigenous groups, representing 70 percent of the population, worked under a sharecropping system. Land reform provided Quechue and Aymare peasants with small plots, but only as subsistence farmers. Coca cultivation, which had traditional uses, was their most important cash crop. The eradication program under Banzer thus caused a significant decline in indigenous farmers' livelihoods, not just those involved in the cocaine trade.

The Weakness of the Presidential System

Since the 1952 revolution, no Bolivian presidential candidate had garnered more than 50 percent of the popular vote. According to the constitution, Congress decided the contest in such cases, choosing among the three top candidates. While in theory this might lead to the development of coalition politics (see, e.g,  Multiparty System), in practice this constitutional delegation of authority frequently meant that the president had no clear mandate to govern. This weakness in the system became evident with the 2002 re-election of Sánchez Lozado, who received just 22 percent of the popular vote. He was forced to resign in October 2003 after a proposed income tax increase and a plan to export natural gas through Chile drew a series of protests that were organized by a new radical party, MAS (Movement Toward Socialism), led by Quechua peasant leader Evo Morales. Sánchez de Lozada's constitutional successor, Vice President Carlos Mesa, was unable to muster political support for his administration. He resigned in June 2005 amid further demonstrations led by Morales demanding full state control over energy and mineral resources.

The December 2005 "Revolution"

MAS and Evo Morales harkened back to the original platform of the 1952 revolution and that era's MNR government. In leading massive street campaigns, Morales wove together the themes of defending coca crop cultivation against U.S. pressure, redressing the historical exclusion of the indigenous population, and asserting national and popular sovereignty over natural resources, an issued that had dominated politics for much of Bolivia's history and was reignited by a boom in silver and tin mining along with recent discoveries of hydrocarbon reserves (Bolivia has the continent's second-largest deposits of natural gas).

In the December 2005 presidential elections, Morales won a landmark victory by securing 55 percent of the vote, largely on the basis of support from previously excluded peasants and workers. It was the first time in decades that the presidential election was decided by an outright majority and thus did not have to be decided by Congress. (A new 2009 Constitution creates a run-off system in case no majority is obtained, thus removing the choice form the legislature.) Morales also became the first indigenous president in Bolivian history.

Since the 2005 election, Morales has kept true to the MAS platform to nationalize the country’s natural resources, renegotiate extraction contracts with foreign firms, adopt land reform and progressive taxation, and defend the coca crop against eradication demands by the U.S. and some Latin American countries. An October 2006 contract with foreign companies quadrupled the government's energy revenues over a four-year period, following which the government nationalized the oil industry, zinc and tin mining companies, as well as electricity generation. In 2013, the government nationalized the Spanish-owned electricity distribution company, Iberdrola.

 In 2006, Morales called for elections to a constituent assembly that would rewrite Bolivia's constitution. The assembly was dominated by MAS, but it was stymied by procedural and other disputes until Morales called a referendum on his presidency. Sixty-six percent of the electorate supported Morales in a vote of confidence, prompting a resolution over the new constitution. The agreement allowed for a dual legal system for indigenous peoples, established limited regional autonomy, and enshrined the rights of indigenous peoples to vote and be politically represented (reserving a minimum number of seats in elected bodies for Amerindians). But it also included opposition demands for a two-term limit on the presidency and broad media and other freedoms. Bolivians adopted the constitution in a separate referendum in January 2009 with 61 percent of the vote in favor. According to the new constitution, the name of the country was changed to the Plurinational State of Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia).

In an election held later in 2009 under the new constitution, voters re-elected Morales to his second term with a 65 percent majority (out of a record 95 percent of eligible voters who turned out). MAS also dominated the legislative elections, winning majorities in both houses. By 2010, all nine territorial departments had passed regional autonomy statutes and MAS won six of the governorships in regional elections. In 2011, however, opposition candidates won mayoralties in most of the major cities.

Current Issues

Bolivia’s new constitution has established a more broad-based consent of Bolivia’s citizens. To achieve his aims, however, President Evo Morales, Bolivia’s dominant political figure for the last decade, has often participated in what scholars have called a "politics of conflicts" with constituencies and regional leaders who oppose him. Prosecutions against political opponents for corruption are frequent.

Freedom of association, including for political parties and trade unions, is generally respected. Regional leaders, citizens’ groups, trade unions, and even leaders of indigenous groups, Morales’s main base of support, have strongly pressed the government to uphold their rights and interests. In December 2010, for example, the Bolivian Workers’ Center announced plans for a national strike the next month to protest an announced end to energy subsidies. The threatened strike caused the government to rescind its decision. In 2011, the residents of the Indigenous Territory and National Park of Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) organized a mass protest against government plans to seize land for a $415 million national roadway financed by Brazil that would link the key regional cities of Trinidad and Cochabamba. Police and army forces beat an estimated 1,500 marchers who were trying to walk from TIPNIS to La Paz. In response, President Morales condemned the police violence, forced the resignations of the Ministry of Interior and Defense chiefs, and ordered a national inquiry. A national consultation demanded by the protestors — and required by the 2009 constitution — was initiated by the government. An investigation by an independent commission (comprised of representatives of the Catholic Church and human rights groups) found that 30 of the 36 affected communities opposed the highway and the government postponed construction.

Freedom of the media and expression is respected but faces a significant threat. While most of the broadcast and print media is independent and features both opposition and government views, the 2011 Telecommunications Law calls for the redistribution of broadcasting licenses to provide the government with control of 33 percent of media. The Bolivian Broadcasting Association complained the law would “restrict the liberty of expression” and stated it could lose 400 broadcasters to the government when their licenses expire in 2017. The Association also complains that imprecise provisions in an anti-racism law adopted in 2010 — aimed at reducing Bolivia’s prevalent discrimination against the indigenous population — has forced independent media to “self-censor” due to fears of government fines and shutdowns for violations of the statute. The government remains antagonistic to independent media, but generally respects the right to publish and broadcast. At the same time, it has done little to prevent continuing incidents of citizens attacking journalists. Also, in recent judicial elections, the government placed restrictions on reporting on candidates.

The  rule of law, however, has been compromised. In 2011, Bolivia became the first Latin American country to elect judges to national and regional positions, but the law allowed only candidates that were nominated by the legislature. As a result, only MAS-backed candidates were on the ballot and since the judicial elections several investigations against MAS-backed politicians have been dropped. More significantly, in 2013, the Constitutional Tribunal granted Morales the right to run in 2014 elections for a third term as president, ruling that his first election in 2005 occurred under a previous constitution. The ruling went against a specific stipulation in the 2009 Constitution, insisted upon by the opposition, that the prior 2005 election be considered part of the two-term limit. This exertion of power prompted the nation’s trade union federation and farmers’ unions to launch their own parties to challenge MAS in the 2014 general elections.

The 2014 elections, however, re-established the dominance of both Evo Morales, who won a third term as president with more than 60 percent of the vote, as well as his political party. MAS retained a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament. The presidential candidate of the Democratic Union Front (UD) captured just 25 percent of the vote. The UD and Christian Democratic parties, the only two to pass the 3 percent threshold, together won just 41 seats in the 130-member Assembly, the lower house, and 11 of 36 seats in the Senate. With a sufficient majority to pass constitutional amendments, MAS legislators proposed in September 2015 to remove the two-term limit for the presidency to allow Evo Morales to run for a fourth term overall in 2019. The measure was presented to the electorate in a referendum held in early 2016, but in a surprise the proposed fourth term was defeated by a 51-49 percent majority. The result indicated that despite previous support for MAS and Morales, the citizenry was not willing to extend the president’s proposed extension of power.

In foreign policy, Evo Morales adopted an antagonistic policy towards the U.S., expelling both the Drug Enforcement Agency as well as the ambassador in 2009 on grounds they took part in a conspiracy against him. In turn, Morales redirected Bolivian foreign policy toward a new alliance with Cuba and Venezuela, the most vociferous opponents of the U.S. in the hemisphere. Although Morales signed a new diplomatic agreement with the U.S. in 2011 and accepted a new ambassador’s credentials in 2012, in July 2013 he ordered the expulsion of the U.S. Agency for International Development from Bolivia and stopped all U.S. assistance programs, also claiming these were being used to undermine his government.