When did the US Supreme Court first begin to require appointment of counsel to indigent criminal defendants in some cases?

Clarence Earl Gideon was an unlikely hero.  He was a man with an eighth-grade education who ran away from home when he was in middle school.  He spent much of his early adult life as a drifter, spending time in and out of prisons for nonviolent crimes.

Gideon was charged with breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, which is a felony under Florida law.  At trial, Gideon appeared in court without an attorney.  In open court, he asked the judge to appoint counsel for him because he could not afford an attorney.  The trial judge denied Gideon’s request because Florida law only permitted appointment of counsel for poor defendants charged with capital offenses. 

At trial, Gideon represented himself – he made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made arguments emphasizing his innocence.  Despite his efforts, the jury found Gideon guilty and he was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

Gideon sought relief from his conviction by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court.  In his petition, Gideon challenged his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial judge’s refusal to appoint counsel violated Gideon’s constitutional rights.  The Florida Supreme Court denied Gideon’s petition.

Gideon next filed a handwritten petition in the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Court agreed to hear the case to resolve the question of whether the right to counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution applies to defendants in state court.

Procedure:

Lower Courts: Bay County Circuit Court, Fourteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida
Lower Court Ruling: The trial judge denied Gideon’s request for a court-appointed attorney because, under Florida law, counsel could only be appointed for a poor defendant charged with a capital offense. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and denied all relief.

Issue:

A prior decision of the Court’s, Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), held that the refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony in state court did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court granted Gideon’s petition for a writ of certiorari – that is, agreed to hear Gideon’s case and review the decision of the lower court – in order to determine whether Betts should be reconsidered.

Ruling:

Reversed and remanded.  In its opinion, the Court unanimously overruled Betts v. Brady.

Argued: January 15, 1963

Decided: March 18, 1963

Unanimous Decision: Justice Black (who dissented in Betts) wrote the opinion of the court.  Justices Douglas, Clark, and Harlan each wrote concurring opinions.

Reasoning:

The Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and, as such, applies the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In overturning Betts, Justice Black stated that “reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”  He further wrote that the “noble ideal” of “fair trials before impartial tribunals  in which ever defendant stands equal before the law . . . cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”

DISCLAIMER: These resources are created by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for educational purposes only. They may not reflect the current state of the law, and are not intended to provide legal advice, guidance on litigation, or commentary on any pending case or legislation.

The right to counsel refers to the right of a criminal defendant to have a lawyer assist in his defense, even if he cannot afford to pay for an attorney. The Sixth Amendment gives defendants the right to counsel in federal prosecutions. However, the right to counsel was not applied to state prosecutions for felony offenses until 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335. This was done through the incorporation doctrine. However, for certain misdemeanors, there is not a guaranteed right to counsel. 

One area of controversy related to the right to counsel is the question of when the right attaches, or, in other words, when, in the process of criminal prosecution, the defendant gains the right to counsel. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a defendant gains the right to an attorney “at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him, whether by formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."

In United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984), the Court clarified that an inmate suspected of committing murder while in prison (i.e. murdering another inmate) lacks the right to counsel while in administrative segregation prior to indictment, because said segregation happens before the "initiation of adversary judicial proceedings."

In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that the right to counsel implies the right to an effective lawyer. To determine whether a court-appointed attorney has given effective counsel, courts will use the test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court established a two-prong test for whether a court-appointed attorney has given the proper amount of care to a court-appointed client:

  1. Error Prong
    1. whether counsel's performance is deficient under the circumstances, with performance being measured under the standard of prevailing professional norms
      1. this largely relies upon custom
  2. Prejudice Prong
    1. Whether the lawyer's supposed subpar conduct affected, with reasonable probability, the trial's outcome
      1. this relies upon but-for causation: "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different"

If the counsel fails this test, then the remedy is to have a new trial. 

The Conflict Between The Right to Effective Counsel and The Issue of Perjury

In Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), the Supreme Court found that an attorney in a criminal trial has a duty not to allow client to give perjured information. The ethical duty of an attorney not to allow perjured info supersedes a duty of zealous advocacy. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant is not violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured evidence at trial.

The right to effective counsel typically entails that the attorney engaged in zealous advocacy for the defendant. However, there are exceptions to what attorneys may do for their defendants. In United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32040, 24 ELR 20706, 37 ERC (BNA) 2078 (4th Cir. W. Va. Dec. 9, 1993), the court found that when a client wants to engage in perjury, the client's attorney is required to compel the client not to commit perjury, even if the perjury can benefit the client's outcome. The court found that an attorney who does not do so has violated the attorney's duty of candor and good faith required to protect the integrity of the judicial process. 

Further, while most jurisdictions do not require an attorney to proceed with full representation of a client after the client attempts to commit perjury, some jurisdictions do require that the attorney stops representing the client, while other jurisdictions require that the attorney continues the representation. 

Further Reading

For more on the right to counsel, see this Harvard Law Review article, this University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review article, and this William & Mary Law Review article. 

“If an obscure Florida convict named Clarence Earl Gideon had not sat down in his prison cell with a pencil and paper to write a letter to the Supreme Court, and if the Court had not taken the trouble to look for merit in that one crude petition ... the vast machinery of American law would have gone on functioning undisturbed. But Gideon did write that letter, the Court did look into his case ... and the whole course of American legal history has been changed.”

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy Speech Before the New England Conference on the Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime

November 1, 1963

On March 18, 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, unanimously holding that defendants facing serious criminal charges have a right to counsel at state expense if they cannot afford one.  The time that has passed since Gideon have demonstrated that effective legal assistance for all persons charged with crimes is critical to safeguarding justice and fairness in the criminal process.  On the 50th anniversary of Gideon, the Justice Department reaffirmed its commitment to supporting the highest standards in criminal defense.

History

Clarence Gideon was accused of a felony in Panama City, Florida and convicted after the trial judge denied Gideon’s request to have counsel appointed to represent him.  The Supreme Court agreed to hear Gideon’s case and granted him a new trial, ruling that legal assistance is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial” and that due process requires states to provide a lawyer for any indigent person being prosecuted for a serious crime.  After being retried with the help of a local attorney, who had the time and skill to investigate his case and conduct a competent defense, Gideon was acquitted of all charges.

The right to appointed counsel has been extended to misdemeanor and juvenile proceedings.  Today, states and localities make use of a variety of systems to provide indigent defense, from state- and county-based public defenders, to appointment systems that reimburse private attorneys who represent indigent defendants.

Despite the significant progress that has been made over 50 years after the decision, the promise of Gideon remains unfulfilled.  The quality of criminal defense services varies widely across states and localities.  Many defenders struggle under excessive caseloads and lack adequate funding and independence, making it impossible for them to meet their legal and ethical obligations to represent their clients effectively.  The problems of mental illness and juveniles in our criminal justice system pose special difficulties for achieving fairness and justice.  

As Attorney General Eric Holder has stated, “our criminal justice system, and our faith in it, depends on effective representation on both sides.”  The Justice Department is providing a number of tools and resources to help establish effective indigent defense systems across the nation.  In 2010 the Department also launched the Office for Access to Justice — establishing a new, permanent office focused on enhancing access to criminal and civil legal services for those who cannot afford them. 

The Supreme’s Court recognition in Gideon that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries,” and its guarantee of the right to counsel in the state criminal process, has had a profound impact on the operation and aspirations of the American criminal justice system.  The Justice Department is committed to working to ensure that the goals and vision of Gideon are fully, and finally, realized.