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Ancient Greek philosophy[edit]Pre-Socratics[edit]Early Hellenistic religious accounts of man's fate explored the degree of human freedom permitted by the gods. A strong fatalism is present in tales that foretell the future, based on the idea that the gods have foreknowledge of future events. Anxious not to annoy the gods, the myth-makers rarely challenged the idea that the gods' foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom. The Moirai (the Fates) were thought to determine every person's destiny at birth. The first thinkers to look for explanatory causes (ἀιτία) in natural phenomena (rather than gods controlling events) were the Pre-Socratic philosophers (physiologoi). The reasons or rules (λόγοι) behind the physical (φύσις) world became the ideal "laws" governing material phenomena. Anaximander (610–546 BC) coined the term physis (φύσις) and perhaps even the cosmological combination of cosmos (κόσμος), as organized nature, and logos (λόγος), as the law behind nature. The Greeks had a separate word for the laws (or conventions) of society, nomos (νόμος). Heraclitus (535–475 BC) claimed that everything changes ("you can't step twice into the same river"), but that there were laws or rules (the logos) behind all the change. The early cosmologists imagined that the universal laws were all-powerful and must therefore explain the natural causes behind all things, from the regular motions of the heavens to the mind (νοῦς) of man. These physiologoi transformed pre-philosophical arguments about gods controlling the human will into arguments about pre-existing causes controlling it. Democritus and Leucippus[edit]The materialist philosophers Democritus and his mentor Leucippus are considered to be the first determinists. They claimed that all things, including humans, were made of atoms in a void, with individual atomic motions strictly controlled by causal laws. Democritus said:
Democritus's philosophy wrested control of man's fate from the gods, but ironically, he and Leucippus originated two of the great dogmas of determinism, physical determinism and logical necessity, which lead directly to the traditional and modern problem of free will and determinism. Leucippus declared an absolute necessity that left no room in the cosmos for chance.
The consequence is a world with but one possible future, completely determined by its past. Socrates[edit]In Plato's Gorgias (and in the Protagoras 345c4-e6), Socrates argues that no one does wrong willingly, one of the most famous doctrines to be associated with him. When framed in modern (Western) terms, the implication is that it is ignorance, rather that free individual agency, that is responsible for morally wrong actions. Aristotle[edit]Michael Frede typifies the prevailing view of recent scholarship, namely that Aristotle did not have a notion of free-will.[4] Aristotle elaborated the four possible causes (material, efficient, formal, and final). Aristotle's word for these causes was ἀιτία, which translates as "causes" in the sense of the multiple factors responsible for an event. Aristotle did not subscribe to the simplistic "every event has a (single) cause" idea that was to come later. Then, in his Physics and Metaphysics, Aristotle also said there were "accidents" caused by "chance (τυχή)". In his Physics, he noted that the early physicists had found no place for chance among their causes. Aristotle opposed his accidental chance to necessity:
Tracing any particular sequence of events back in time will usually come to an accidental event – a "starting point" or "fresh start" (Aristotle calls it an origin or arche (ἀρχή) – whose major contributing cause (or causes) was itself uncaused. Whether a particular thing happens, says Aristotle, may depend on a series of causes that
In general, many such causal sequences contribute to any event, including human decisions. Each sequence has a different time of origin, some going back before we were born, some originating during our deliberations. Beyond causal sequences that are the result of chance or necessity, Aristotle felt that some breaks in the causal chain allow us to feel our actions "depend on us" (ἐφ' ἡμῖν). These are the causal chains that originate within us (ἐv ἡμῖν). Richard Sorabji's 1980 Necessity, Cause, and Blame surveyed Aristotle's positions on causation and necessity, comparing them to his predecessors and successors, especially the Stoics and Epicurus. Sorabji argues that Aristotle was an indeterminist, that real chance and uncaused events exist, but never that human actions are uncaused in the extreme libertarian sense that some commentators mistakenly attribute to Epicurus.
Although he thinks Aristotle was not aware of the "problem" of free will vis-a-vis determinism (as first described by Epicurus), Sorabji thinks Aristotle's position on the question is clear enough. Voluntariness is too important to fall before theoretical arguments about necessity and determinism.
Epicureanism[edit]It is with Epicurus and the Stoics that clearly indeterministic and deterministic positions are first formulated. Writing one generation after Aristotle, Epicurus argued that as atoms moved through the void, there were occasions when they would "swerve" (clinamen) from their otherwise determined paths, thus initiating new causal chains. Epicurus argued that these swerves would allow us to be more responsible for our actions (libertarianism), something impossible if every action was deterministically caused. Epicurus did not say the swerve was directly involved in decisions. But following Aristotle, Epicurus thought human agents have the autonomous ability to transcend necessity and chance (both of which destroy responsibility), so that praise and blame are appropriate. Epicurus finds a tertium quid (a third option), beyond necessity (Democritus' physics) and beyond Aristotle's chance. His tertium quid is agent autonomy, what is "up to us". Here is the first explicit argument for libertarian free will.
Lucretius (1st century BCE), a strong supporter of Epicurus, saw the randomness as enabling free will, even if he could not explain exactly how, beyond the fact that random swerves would break the causal chain of determinism.
In 1967, Pamela Huby suggested that Epicurus was the original discoverer of the "free-will problem". Huby noted that there had been two main free-will problems, corresponding to different determinisms, namely theological determinism (predestination and foreknowledge) and the physical causal determinism of Democritus.
In 2000, Susanne Bobzien challenged Pamela Huby's 1967 assertion that Epicurus discovered the "free-will problem".
Bobzien thinks Epicurus did not have a model of what she calls "two-sided freedom," because she believes that Epicurus
A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, however, agree with Pamela Huby that Epicurus was the first to notice the modern problem of free will and determinism.
The question remains how random swerves can help to explain free action. In her 1992 book, The Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Julia Annas wrote:
One view, going back to the 19th century historian Carlo Giussani, is that Epicurus' atomic swerves are involved directly in every case of human free action, not just somewhere in the past that breaks the causal chain of determinism.[14] In 1928 Cyril Bailey agreed with Giussani that the atoms of the mind-soul provide a break in the continuity of atomic motions, otherwise actions would be necessitated. Bailey imagined complexes of mind-atoms that work together to form a consciousness that is not determined, but also not susceptible to the pure randomness of individual atomic swerves, something that could constitute Epicurus' idea of actions being "up to us" (πὰρ' ἡμάς).[15] Bailey states that Epicurus did not identify freedom of the will with chance.
In 1967 David Furley de-emphasized the importance of the swerve in both Epicurus and Lucretius so as to defend Epicurus from the "extreme" libertarian view that our actions are caused directly by random swerves. (Bailey had also denied this "traditional interpretation".) Furley argues for a strong connection between the ideas of Aristotle and Epicurus on autonomous actions that are "up to us".
On the other hand, in his 1983 thesis, "Lucretius on the Clinamen and 'Free Will'", Don Paul Fowler defended the ancient claim that Epicurus proposed random swerves as directly causing our actions.
In a 1999 Phronesis article, Purinton agreed with Fowler that random swerves directly cause volitions and actions:
Stoicism[edit]The Stoics solidified the idea of natural laws controlling all things, including the mind. Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, saw that every event had a cause, and that cause necessitated the event. Given exactly the same circumstances, exactly the same result will occur.
The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus The major developer of Stoicism, Chrysippus, took the edge off of strict necessity. Whereas the past is unchangeable, Chrysippus argued that some future events that are possible do not occur by necessity from past external factors alone, but might (as Aristotle and Epicurus maintained) depend on us. We have a choice to assent or not to assent to an action. Chrysippus said our actions are determined (in part by ourselves as causes) and fated (because of God's foreknowledge), but he also said that they are not necessitated, i.e., pre-determined from the distant past. Chrysippus would be seen today as a compatibilist. R. W. Sharples describes the first compatibilist arguments to reconcile responsibility and determinism by Chrysippus
Alexander of Aphrodisias[edit]The Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 150–210), the most famous of the ancient commentators on Aristotle, defended a view of moral responsibility we would call libertarianism today. Greek philosophy had no precise term for "free will" as did Latin (liberum arbitrium or libera voluntas). The discussion was in terms of responsibility, what "depends on us" (in Greek ἐφ ἡμῖν). Alexander believed that Aristotle was not a strict determinist like the Stoics, and Alexander argued that some events do not have pre-determined causes. In particular, man is responsible for self-caused decisions, and can choose to do or not to do something, as Chrysippus argued. However, Alexander denied the foreknowledge of events that was part of the Stoic identification of God and Nature. R. W. Sharples described Alexander's De Fato as perhaps the most comprehensive treatment surviving from classical antiquity of the problem of responsibility (τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμίν) and determinism. It especially shed a great deal of light on Aristotle's position on free will and on the Stoic attempt to make responsibility compatible with determinism.[22] Ancient Abrahamic religion[edit]Judaism[edit]Ancient Judaism[edit]The ancient Hebrews distinguished between voluntary (willful) choices and actions, versus compelled actions, but the Hebrew scriptures are permeated with the notion that the will is always bound to the heart, and determined by the condition of one's heart. For the Ancient Hebrews, the "heart" (levav) is the "seat of volition,"[23] the locus of a person's desires, preferences, proclivities, inclinations, and motives. Humans will and choose, and do so voluntarily, but they do what they do according to the status of their hearts, which determines their desires, preferences, proclivities, inclinations, and motives.[24] For the will to be changed, according to Ezekiel, God must first change the heart (Ezekiel 36:26-27) The way the heart compels the will is exemplified in the book of Exodus (among others), referring to gifts and offerings:
The words above, "willing offering," is the single Hebrew word nedabah. It was translated in 1611 by King James' bible translators "freewill offering." The Hebrew nedabah “freewill offering” was “free” only insofar as it was free from compulsion by the legal requirement; free only applies to the nature of the offering in the legal sense. But the word “free” is not part of the word “nedabah.” In fact, the meaning of nadab is to be compelled/incited/impelled by one's heart.[25] The will or choice is moved by the condition of the heart. It is willing, it happens voluntarily, because the heart impels it so. The adjective "freewill" set this kind of offering apart from other offerings (nederim) that were required by law and not, therefore, given by freewill. The word "freewill" in this context is not, therefore, referring to the metaphysical powers of the soul, but rather simply distinguishing voluntary offerings from compulsory offerings.[26][27] This is not what philosophers today refer to as libertarian free will. Isaiah the prophet painted a picture of God as a grand potter, with humans as passive clay in His hands. Isaiah said that man should not question the fact that God sovereignty controls him like passive inanimate dirt (Isaiah 29:16, 45:9). A central theme of Judaism to this day is that the Jews are God's “chosen” people, not because they freely chose God, but because of God's oath to Abraham (See Deuteronomy 9:5-6). Second Temple Judaism[edit]Jews during Second Temple Judaism were actually divided on the question of free-will. According to Josephus, the Pharisees and Sadducees held to a view of free will, while the Essenes were more deterministic.[28][29][30]
Christianity[edit]In concurrence with the Hebrew teaching on the subject (see above), the term "free will" is absent from scholarly translations of the New Testament, but some theologians still suggest that the notion of free will is implicit. Passionate debate has raged for centuries among scholars on both sides of the question. Christian denominations have often been divided on the question. Dr. Alister McGrath, writes, “The term ‘free will’ is not biblical, but derives from Stoicism. It was introduced into Western Christianity by the second-century theologian Tertullian.”[32] He also notes, “The pre-Augustinian theological tradition is practically of one voice in asserting the freedom of the human will”.[33] Early church fathers prior to Augustine refuted non-choice predeterminism as being pagan.[34][35][36] Out of the fifty early Christian authors who wrote on the debate between free will and determinism, all fifty supported Christian free will against Stoic, Gnostic, and Manichaean determinism and even Augustine taught traditional Christian theology against this determinism for twenty-six years prior to 412 CE.[37] When Augustine started fighting the Pelagians he aligned his view with the Gnostic and Manichaean view and taught that humankind has no free will to believe until God infuses grace, which in turn results in saving faith.[38][39][40] In 529, at the Second Council of Orange, the question at hand was whether the doctrines of Augustine on God's providence were to be affirmed, or if Semi-Pelagianism could be affirmed. Semi-Pelagianism was a moderate form of Pelagianism which teaches that the first step of Salvation is by human will and not the grace of God.[41] The determination of the Council could be considered "semi-Augustinian".[42][43][44] It defined that faith, though a free act of man, resulted, even in its beginnings, from the grace of God, enlightening the human mind and enabling belief.[45][46][47] This describes the operation of prevenient grace allowing the unregenerate to repent in faith.[48][49] On the other hand, the Council of Orange condemned the Augustinian teaching of predestination to damnation.[50] The early leaders of the Protestant Reformation largely echoed Augustine's later views on free will. There was typically a strong Augustine's influence on John Calvin.[51] On the other hand, the Catholic Council of Trent re-affirmed the Second Council of Orange position against Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism.[52] Likewise, the Remonstrants and later Arminians/Wesleyans have been aligned with the Semi-Augustinian position of the canons of the Second Council of Orange concerning free will.[53][44] Notes and references[edit]Citations[edit]
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Which philosophers did not believe in free will?The 19th-century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is known as a critic of Judeo-Christian morality and religions in general. One of the arguments he raised against the truthfulness of these doctrines is that they are based upon the concept of free will, which, in his opinion, does not exist.
What was Aristotle's view on free will?1) According to the Aristotle, free will and moral responsibility is determined by our character. 2) According to absolute free will (indeterminism), free actions cannot be determined in any fashion. 3) Therefore, you cannot endorse Aristotle's view, and also affirm absolute free will.
What was Socrates view on free will?for socrates free will and self-control are one and the same, combined in his commitment to the doctrine that reason, properly cultivated, can and ought to be the all-controlling factor in human life.
What philosophers say free will?In juxtaposition, causal determinism states that free will is limited or does not exist. Philosophical arguments are presented by: Plato, Hobbes, Hume, Leibniz, and Hegel. Plato offers a dual theory offering limited support for free will. Leibnitz includes theological tenets to make the case for predetermined outcomes.
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